






























The Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC) seeks to be a 
leader on issues related to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the global economy, paying 
special attention to the sustainability dimension of this investment. It focuses on the 
analysis and teaching of the implications of FDI for public policy and international 
investment law. Its objectives are to analyze important topical policy-oriented issues 
related to FDI, develop and disseminate practical approaches and solutions, and provide 
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Succinct yet insightful reports are most welcome – especially in our era, distracted as it is 
by a rising tide of shallow commentary. For those who care about foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the premier reports are Columbia FDI Perspectives, published every 
few weeks by the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment. Since 
the first issue (here republished as chapter 2) appeared in November 2008, the 
Perspectives have adhered to a format of about two pages, authored by a leading expert, 
on an FDI question of immediate interest. Consequently, there is no better way to keep 
abreast of changing trends and emerging themes.   
 
Chapter 2 carries the prescient title, “The FDI recession has begun”; several issues 
(chapters 9-13) document the ascent and challenges of multinational enterprises based in 
emerging markets, particularly Brazil, India and China; chapter 6 explores farm deals in 
Africa with the provocative title, “Land grab or development opportunity?”; chapter 1 
reveals that emerging markets would attract more than half of FDI in the midst of the 
Great Recession; chapters. 29 and 30 debate the arbitration featuring environmental 
claims between Pacific Rim LLC and El Salvador; chapter 22 surprisingly reports that 
general counsels often know little and care less about bilateral investment treaties. 
 
Fortunately for FDI watchers, these issues of the Perspectives and many more – in fact 
the complete collection through 2010 – are now available in a single eBook. Corporate 
executives, who always have too much to read, will find this eBook essential for a quick 
briefing. Scholars, who always want to read more, will find the eBook a great place to 
start their quest. And policy officials, who want to know how the wind is blowing on hot 
questions, can find the direction from these Perspectives.  
 
Much credit for this collection goes to the editor-in-chief, Karl P. Sauvant, the world’s 
pioneer in gathering reliable statistical information on foreign direct investment, a 
lifelong observer of FDI questions and a foremost scholar of multinational enterprises. 
Together with his team at the Vale Columbia Center, Sauvant has done a great service to 
those of us who care about FDI trends and emerging themes.      
 
Gary Clyde Hufbauer 
Reginald Jones Senior Fellow 




Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become an increasingly important feature of the 
globalized economy in the past 20 years. Global FDI inflows more than quintupled from 
1990 to 2009, rising from US$208 billion to US$1.1 trillion, resulting in a cumulative 
stock of nearly US$18 trillion by end-2009. International investment has become roughly 
twice as important as trade in delivering goods and services across frontiers. The rapid 
growth of global FDI—which has grown faster than world GDP—reflects major 
underlying policy changes toward FDI in host and home countries. In addition to 
widespread liberalization of national investment policies, especially in developing 
countries and former centrally planned economies, many countries have now also 
adopted active FDI attraction strategies through a proliferation of investment promotion 
agencies at both national and sub-national levels. 
 
The rapid growth in the importance of investment flows raises a number of important 
issues. There is first of all the question of the impact of FDI on host and home countries, 
particularly the extent to which positive effects can be enhanced and negative effects 
minimized – largely a policy question. The steep rise in the number of international 
investment agreements and disputes has generated discussion about the nature of the 
international investment regime. The proliferation of treaties that govern investment 
flows has raised questions not only about their utility and importance but also about the 
suitability of their content, especially (but not only) for developing countries.  There are 
also questions about the ability of international arbitration mechanisms to resolve 
disputes fairly, affordably and consistently. Increased FDI flows from sovereign wealth 
funds and state-owned enterprises have raised concerns about the impact of such 
investment on national security and created a ripple effect of legislation and guidelines to 
govern sovereign investment. More generally, there is continuing discussion about the 
balance in the international investment regime between investors’ rights and 
responsibilities on the one hand and host countries’ rights and responsibilities on the 
other, and whether we are heading for a “rebalancing” of the regime. The discussions 
about these and other issues raised by the global surge in FDI take place in classrooms, 
boardrooms and legislatures. 
 
In late 2008, as financial markets were crashing, the Vale Columbia Center on 
Sustainable International Investment launched the Columbia FDI Perspectives. The first 
Perspective, entitled “The FDI recession has begun”, correctly forecast an FDI recession 
in the following year. From that first Perspective in late 2008 to the end of 2010, the 
series published thirty-three concise notes on topical FDI-related issues by diverse 
experts in the field. The purpose of these Perspectives is to inform readers about some of 
the important issues and trends in the contemporary debate on FDI, and to promote a 
wide-ranging discussion about the policy implications of these trends and events. 
 
The topics of these Perspectives, while not an exhaustive list of the issues raised by the 
global investment regime, capture a dynamic period in the global debate on international 
xx 
investment and reflect many hot topics and issues of continuing relevance in 2009-2010.  
Topics ranged from the implications of the financial crisis and recession for major 
economies, to the changing geography of the international investment regime and policy 
questions faced by emerging markets; from the implications of sovereign investment for 
national security and measures taken to restrict such investment, to policy options for 
countries seeking to increase inward investment flows and trying to stay competitive in a 
downward market; from investment in land and agriculture, to investment in extractive 
industries – raising important questions both for national policy and for the international 
investment regime.  
 
The range of topics reflects the multifaceted, interdisciplinary and rapidly evolving nature 
of key issues in international investment. This compilation of the Perspectives offers 
snapshots of some of the most topical issues of 2009-2010 and an opportunity to connect 
the dots, drawing out the interconnections among the various themes addressed in the 
stand-alone Perspectives. It is the collection of these issues and policy considerations 
that, woven together, forms the changing fabric of the international investment regime. 
By putting these pieces together in one volume, this e-book allows a clearer picture to 
emerge.  
 
Two years of these Perspectives capture an extraordinary range of topics. Yet some 
important areas remain underexposed in this volume. We expect that future Perspectives 
(to be posted on www.vcc.columbia.edu) will fill some of these gaps, including, for 
instance, by addressing the implications of the investment regime for climate change 
policy, the impact on human rights and mechanisms to maximize the contribution of 
investment to sustainable development. 
 
The Vale Columbia Center welcomes submissions on these and all other FDI-related 
topics for future Perspectives, to share new and important developments in the field and 
to continue the generation and discussion of new approaches and policy 
recommendations to keep apace with the ever-growing importance of foreign direct 
investment. 
 
Karl P. Sauvant                                                                              New York, January 2011 
Lisa Sachs 
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The global economic and financial crisis has had a major impact on FDI flows. After 
declining in 2008 by 17% to US$ 1.73 trillion from US$ 2.09 trillion in 2007 – the high 
point of a four-year long boom in cross-border M&As and FDI – global FDI inflows are 
forecast to plunge by 44% to less than US$ 1 trillion in 2009.1 The big drop in 2009 is 
occurring despite the improvements in the global economy in recent months. A notable 
feature of trends in 2009 is that, for the first time ever, emerging markets are set to attract 
more FDI inflows than the developed world. 
 
Global FDI plummets in first half of 2009 
Global FDI inflows are estimated to have contracted by 49% in the first half of 2009 
compared with the same period in 2008. The estimate is based on data for 54 countries 
(20 developed countries and 34 emerging markets) that accounted for just under 90% of 
total global FDI inflows in 2008. For 47 of the countries, FDI inflows in the first half of 
2009 were lower than in the first half of 2008; only seven countries recorded growth in 
inflows over this period. The decline in inflows to developed countries was significantly 
sharper than the drop for emerging markets – by 54% and 40%, respectively. The 
declines were especially marked in the U.S. and U.K., by 68% and 85% respectively. 
Among emerging market regions, the sharpest decline, by 55%, was to Eastern Europe. 
Flows to Latin America and to emerging Asia declined by one third in each case (China, 
the main emerging market FDI recipient, had a decline of only 18%; FDI flows to Brazil 
and Mexico dropped by 25%). 
 
Only a modest improvement is expected in the second half of 2009. In particular, despite 
improved global economic trends in recent months, a significant recovery in M&As will 
not happen soon.2 Rising confidence and a rally in equity markets have failed to boost 
M&As as corporations remain very cautious and bank financing is constrained. The nine-
month 2009 data for M&As were not encouraging. According to data provider Dealogic, 
                                                 
*
 The author wishes to thank Gary Hufbauer and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on this 
chapter. It was first published as a Perspective on October 8, 2009.  
1
 Unless otherwise stated, all FDI estimates and forecasts are from the Economist Intelligence Unit. The 
data reported here for 2008 are of more recent vintage and, because of that, as well as the use of different 
sources in some cases, the totals differ slightly from the data reported in UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report 2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 
2009). The revised estimates for 2008 and forecasts for 2009 also differ slightly from data that appeared in 
the Economist Intelligence Unit, “The world economy and plunging FDI,” Viewswire, (2009). 
2
 FDI flows are dominated by trends in cross-border M&As, and the correlation between global FDI 
inflows and the value of completed cross-border M&A sales is very high. This is not only because cross-
border M&As make up a large share of FDI, but also because even non-M&A components of FDI are 
affected by similar forces that affect M&As.  
3 
the value of M&A deals globally of US$ 1.62 trillion in the first nine months of 2009 was 
down by 37% on the same period in 2008.3 According to Thomson Reuters data, the 
value of deals totaled US$ 369 billion globally in the third quarter of 2009, down by 54% 
on the same quarter in 2008.4 Furthermore, the numbers would look much worse still 
were it not for crisis-related financial deals. Since the latter are mainly domestic deals, 
this means that the decline in cross-border-M&As in 2009 will be significantly sharper 
than the drop in total deal values. 
 
FDI to emerging markets to surpass 50% of global total 
Flows to emerging markets initially proved resilient to the impact of the global crisis. 
Inflows into the developed world declined by one-third in 2008, whereas flows to 
emerging markets increased by 11%. FDI flows to emerging markets will decline 
considerably in 2009, albeit by less than FDI flows to the developed world.5 In 2009, for 
the first time ever, emerging markets are likely to attract more FDI than developed 
countries. The forecast is obviously subject to considerable uncertainty. For example, a 
few large cross-border deals in the final quarter of 2009 could yet tip the balance back in 
favor of developed countries. But even should the emerging market share in global FDI 
inflows fall short of 50%, the share in 2009 will almost certainly be the highest on 
record.6 
 
Practice catches up with theory 
The overall decline in global FDI flows is thus being accompanied by a distinct shift in 
the pattern of FDI. Economic theory tells us that capital should flow from capital-
abundant rich countries to capital-scarce poor countries. In practice, that has not been the 
case as developed countries have consistently attracted the bulk of global FDI flows. 
High risk in many emerging markets, the benefits of advanced institutions and 
infrastructure, and a superior overall business environment in developed countries have 
tended to outweigh the attractions of greater market dynamism and lower costs in 
emerging markets. 
                                                 
3
 “M&A sector: Too early to call a return to normal,” Financial Times, September 25, 2009.  
4
 “M&A shows signs of life,” Reuters, September 29, 2009. 
5
 The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that FDI flows to emerging markets will decline by 35% in 
2009 compared with 2008 (flows to developed countries are forecast to fall by 52%). See annex for 
forecasts for FDI inflows in 2009 by subregions. Although the definitions of emerging markets differ 
considerably, our forecast for the fall in FDI flows to emerging markets is similar to the forecasts made by 
the World Bank (for a 30% decline in Global Development Finance, June 2009, Washington, p. 38) and by 
the Institute of International Finance for a sample of 30 leading emerging markets (by 33%, in Capital 
Flows to Emerging Market Economies, October 2009, Washington, p. 2). 
6
 The definition of what constitutes an emerging market, or the dividing line between developed countries 
and emerging markets, is rather arbitrary. Under Economist Intelligence Unit definitions, the developed 
world category is somewhat smaller than under the definition used by UNCTAD, which includes the eight 
new EU member states from Eastern Europe (all these are considered as emerging markets under most 
definitions). The emerging market share in global FDI inflows is set to surpass 50% in 2009 on both 
definitions, although by a narrower margin on the UNCTAD definition. The Economist Intelligence Unit 
classification is given in Laza Kekic and Karl P. Sauvant, eds., World Investment Prospects to 2011: 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Political Risk (London and New York: Economist 




This time, practice may be catching up to theory. FDI has tended to rise during recessions 
as slumps in M&As have hit the developed world disproportionately (and some 80% of 
cross-border M&A sales are still in developed states). However, other factors are also 
pushing up the share of emerging markets in global FDI inflows. 
 
FDI flows to emerging markets have held up better because their overall economic 
performance has been much better than that of the developed world, which has 
experienced its worst recession since the Second World War. Much of the superior 
performance of emerging markets is, of course, due to the continued fast growth of China 
and India. However, even if China and India are taken out of the equation, most emerging 
markets will have outperformed the developed world in 2009. Emerging markets have 
thus to some extent “decoupled” from the developed economies.7  
 
Globalization and increasing competitive pressure on companies have increased the 
opportunity cost of not investing in emerging markets.8 A recent Economist Unit survey 
provides evidence of a link between investing in emerging markets and corporate 
financial success. Among surveyed companies from developed countries that derive less 
than 5% of their revenue from activities in emerging markets, only 24% reported their 
financial performance as being better than their peers. By contrast, for developed country 
companies that derived more than 5% of their revenue from emerging markets, the share 
reporting better performance than their peers was just under 40%.  
 
The trend of improving business environments and liberalization in many emerging 
markets in recent years has also helped limit the recession-induced fall in FDI inflows. 
Finally, the increased share of emerging markets in outward investment is increasing the 
share of emerging markets in inward flows because a disproportionate share of outward 
investment by emerging markets goes to other emerging markets. 
 
The outlook for 2010 and beyond 
Although the global economy is still weak, conditions are now improving in many 
countries. Global growth resumed in the second half of this year, creating momentum that 
will carry into 2010. The recovery in 2010 will, however, be sluggish and fragile. Global 
growth is unlikely to return any time soon to the trend rate of recent years, as it will be 
constrained by the after-effects of the crisis in 2008-2009. As a result, although global 
FDI inflows are likely to grow in 2010, the recovery will be modest. The growth rates of 
FDI into the developed world and emerging markets are expected to be similar so that 
their shares in global FDI are unlikely to change significantly from 2009. 
 
                                                 
7
 The notable exception is Eastern Europe, which has suffered very badly and its average output is forecast 
to contract by 6% in 2009. 
8
 Economist Intelligence Unit and UK Trade and Investment, Survive and Prosper: Emerging Markets in 
the Global Recession (London: Economic Intelligence Unit, 2009). The Economist intelligence Unit carried 
out a survey of 548 companies from 19 business sectors around the world in July and August 2009. Two-
fifths of the sample was made up of companies headquartered in emerging markets; the remainder were 
companies headquartered in developed countries.  
5 
Companies’ plans for the next five years, as reflected in the aforementioned Economist 
Intelligence Unit survey, Survive and Prosper, imply that emerging markets will attract 
considerable FDI and probably more than developed countries. Just under 60% of 
companies expect to derive more than 20% of their total revenue in emerging markets in 
five years' time – almost double the present proportion of 31%. This would suggest that 
the shift in the distribution of global FDI flows in 2009 is a longer-term development and 





Table 1. FDI inflows (Billions of dollars)    
 2007 2008 2009 
World total 2,092.4 1,730.9 975.2 
   % change 44.8 -17.3 -43.7 
Developed countries 1,355.0 914.7 441.3 
   % change 52.3 -32.5 -51.8 
Emerging markets 737.4 816.3 533.9 
   % change 32.9 10.7 -34.6 
 of which:    
Sub-Saharan Africa 38.0 49.7 30.3 
   % change 14.2 30.7 -39.1 
Middle East & North Africa 81.9 98.1 73.4 
   % change 13.6 19.8 -25.2 
Developing Asia 298.1 323.2 235.5 
   % change 38.9 8.4 -27.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 128.1 140.5 93.8 
   % change 37.1 9.7 -33.3 
Eastern Europe 165.7 183.3 90.4 
   % change 40.8 10.7 -50.7 
    
% share developed countries 64.8 52.8 45.3 
% share emerging markets 35.2 47.2 54.7 
Note: Emerging markets according to Economist Intelligence Unit definitions; see text. 


















Table 2: FDI inflows, % of global FDI inflows     
 UNCTAD definitions  
Economist Intelligence Unit 
definitions   
 
Developed 





1992 69.4 30.6  67.3 32.7   
1993 66.7 33.3  64.3 35.7   
1994 59.7 40.3  57.7 42.3   
1995 65.5 34.5  61.8 38.2   
1996 61.0 39.0  58.3 41.7   
1997 59.9 40.1  57.1 42.9   
1998 72.0 28.0  69.4 30.6   
1999 78.7 21.3  76.9 23.1   
2000 81.5 18.5  79.9 20.1   
2001 69.7 30.3  67.3 32.7   
2002 71.9 28.1  68.0 32.0   
2003 66.3 33.7  63.4 36.6   
2004 57.8 42.2  52.5 47.5   
2005 66.2 33.8  61.6 38.4   
2006 65.9 34.1  61.6 38.4   
2007 68.3 31.7  64.8 35.2   
2008 56.7 43.3  52.8 47.2   
2009 48.4 51.6  45.3 54.7   






The FDI recession has begun 
 
Karl P. Sauvant* 
 
With US$ 1.8 trillion (according to UNCTAD), world FDI flows reached an all-time high 
last year. All major regions benefitted from increased flows. But that was then. What is, 
and will be, the impact of the financial crisis and the recession on FDI flows this year and 
next? 
 
Several forces are at work, best discussed in terms of the three sets of FDI determinants: 
economic conditions, the regulatory framework and investment promotion. If we are 
lucky, as far as the first set of factors is concerned, global GDP will not shrink in 2009, 
although it is currently expected to do so a bit in developed countries offset however by 
expected growth in emerging markets (according to the IMF's latest forecasts). Moreover, 
with the present commodity boom cycle winding down, FDI in natural resources is posed 
to decline as well, affecting especially FDI flows into Africa, Latin America, Russia, and 
Central Asia. 
 
Since economic growth is the single most important FDI determinant for attracting 
investment (and developed countries having received some 70% of FDI flows in 2007), 
this economic slowdown, further accentuated by the financial crisis, makes key markets 
less attractive to invest in – and hence depresses FDI flows. Even from the narrow 
perspective of FDI, the proposals by Jeffrey Sachs (Financial Times, 27 October 2008) 
and George Soros (Financial Times, 29 October 2008) on avoiding a global recession 
should be heeded.  
 
The financial crisis and the credit crunch adds to this impact as it severely restricts the 
ability of firms to invest abroad and finance cross-border M&As which are by far the 
most important form of entering foreign markets for many multinationals. Even where 
M&As do occur, they would involve lower values than, say, six months ago, as share 
prices – and hence the values of companies – have declined, depressing the value of FDI 
flows. The current economic difficulties will also entice parent companies to repatriate 
earnings if not to sell foreign affiliates to shore up their balance sheets, thus reducing net 
FDI flows. Earning downgrades and weak balance sheets make it more difficult for firms 
to finance deals, especially if they have to absorb other financial burdens (e.g., supporting 
the declining value of pension funds) and further deleveraging takes place. These 
considerations apply also to private equity funds, a number of which are in great 
difficulties. (These funds accounted for about one-quarter of the value of cross-border 
M&As in 2007.) The ability of firms to undertake outward FDI is therefore impaired. Not 
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 This chapter was first published as a Perspective on November 22, 2008. 
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surprisingly, the value of cross-border M&As has declined by 28% during the first nine 
months of this year and is likely to decline further.  
 
But the decline could be softened. In particular, if Asian countries and especially China 
should further stimulate domestic demand it would be even more attractive for 
multinationals to increase investment in those markets (although China, with US$ 84 
billion of FDI inflows, was already by far the largest emerging market host country in 
2007).  Similarly, if Asian firms are less affected by the crisis, they may accelerate their 
outward FDI. Chinese outward FDI, for instance, which was US$ 23 billion in 2007, was 
US$ 26 billion during the first half of 2008 alone, possibly reaching US$ 50-60bn during 
this year. Add to that the potential FDI by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs); so far, such 
sovereign FDI has barely taken off (and, in the financial sector, was not very profitable). 
Moreover, undervalued or distressed assets in developed countries and elsewhere beckon, 
helped possibly by the strong currencies of some home countries and the weak currencies 
of some host countries. What this could mean is that important investors are sitting on the 
fence, waiting for the stock market to hit rock bottom, before investing abroad. If so, 
there is a chance that FDI outflows from emerging markets (which were US$ 300 billion 
in 2007) could possibly hold up, a least this year.  
 
This possibility depends on the continuous openness of the regulatory framework for 
FDI, especially in developed countries. While this is, grosso modo, most likely assured, 
there are mounting signs of a reevaluation of, if not distinct uneasiness about, at least 
certain forms of FDI. This is reflected, among other things, in the increase of national 
policy changes, as well as more restrictive review processes, that make the investment 
environment less hospitable, especially for cross-border M&As. A good part of such 
protectionist attitudes is directed against sovereign FDI by state-owned enterprises and 
SWFs from emerging markets – precisely those entities that, at least for the moment, still 
are in a position to continue, if not increase, their outward FDI. It is actually surprising 
how little FDI SWFs have undertaken so far; the skeptical attitude in developed countries 
partly explains this. Regulatory risk could exacerbate the negative economic factors. 
 
It is here where investment promotion comes in: investment promotion agencies 
worldwide can be expected to make an extra effort to convince their governments to keep 
the investment climate welcoming. In fact, investment promotion agencies and individual 
firms seeking strong partners can be expected to make an extra effort to entice 
multinationals, private equity groups and sovereign FDI to come to their shores. How 
influential investment promotion agencies will be in their national decision-making 
processes remains to be seen. 
 
So what does this all add up to? In the current situation of uncertainty it is impossible 
precisely to predict how these various factors will play out. Moreover, they need to be 
seen against the long-term nature of FDI, undertaken in-line with broader corporate 
strategies, which makes this type of investment more stable than portfolio investment (as 
we have seen during the Asian financial crisis) and hence could mitigate some of the 
immediate negative effects.  In the past, a recession was typically followed in one-to-two 
years by a decline in FDI flows. This time, the credit crunch is accelerating the onset of 
9 
the decline and it is likely to deepen it. It is quite certain that FDI flows in 2008, and 
especially in 2009, will decline – the only question is by how much and for how long. 
 
The steepness of the decline will largely be a function of how deep, long and widespread 
the recession will be. The decline is likely to be at least 20% this year and could well 
reach another 30% or more next year – making an already difficult economic situation 
even more difficult. If anything, the FDI recession puts a premium on maintaining a 




FDI incentives pay – politically 
 
Nathan M. Jensen and Edmund J. Malesky * 
 
Despite broad skepticism about the benefits of globalization, the majority of U.S. states 
have offered lucrative tax incentives to attract investment.9 The size of these incentives is 
generally considered too large to be welfare enhancing, and many economists are 
skeptical of the effectiveness of these policies. Yet despite the mounting evidence to the 
contrary, the incentives offered by U.S. states (and foreign countries) continue and have 
actually increased in their generosity over time.  
 
In the fall of 2009, we sought to solve this puzzle by conducting an Internet survey of 
2,000 Americans as part of a Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) project. 
In this survey, we included questions to assess how individuals feel about FDI and the 
individuals’ efforts to hold politicians accountable for its attraction.10 Our central finding 
is that politicians can use tax incentives to take credit for investment flowing into their 
district, or deflect blame for losing the competition for mobile firms. Thus, fiscal 
incentives, while economically inefficient, may be a useful tool for politicians to win 
reelection.   
 
Our first question in the survey asked: “In recent years  ____ companies have invested in 
the United States. Do you think these investments are good for the U.S. economy?” One-
third of the respondents had the above blank filled in with the word “foreign,” one-third 
with “Japanese,” and one-third with “Chinese.” When asked about foreign companies, 
the majority of respondents (55%) indicated that these investments are good for the U.S. 
economy. A sizable percentage disagreed (22%) or answered “don’t know” (23%). 
Support for investment increased when asked about Japanese investment, where 61% of 
the respondents answered “yes,” and the remainder answered “no” (18%) and “don’t 
know” (21%). This support plummeted to only 35% when asked about Chinese 
investment, with 45% answering “no” and 20% “don’t know.” 
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 The authors thank the Center for Empirical Legal Research and the Weidenbaum Center for the Study of 
Economy, Government, and Public Policy for funding this survey. They also wish to thank David Leblang, 
Glen Biglaiser, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on this chapter. It was first 
published as a Perspective on June 28, 2010.  
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 The 2008 Pew Global Attitudes Survey found that only 25% of Americans thought foreign investment had 
a “very good” or “somewhat good” impact on the United States while 67% answered “negative” or “very 
negative” opinion. http://pewglobal.org/category/data-sets/ 
10
 Nathan M Jensen, Edmund Malesky, Mariana Medina, and Ugur Ozdemir, “Pass the bucks: investment 
incentives as political credit-claiming devices. Evidence from a survey experiment,” Paper presented at the 
2010 Globalization and Governance Conference, (Washington University in St. Louis, 2010). 
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These survey results reveal mixed support for FDI with sizeable minorities either 
skeptical or uncertain of its benefits. When asked about Chinese investment, the skeptics 
outnumber the supporters, likely due the perception of China as our closest foreign 
competitor. We imagine that a similar survey in the 1980s may have found skepticism 
toward Japanese investment, when Japan was seen as our closest rival. 
 
A second set of questions11 asked citizens about their voting intentions for governor. 
While many factors affect voting for governor, attracting investment (foreign or 
domestic) has become central to many governors’ economic development strategies. We 
asked respondents to imagine a 1,000-job manufacturing facility either choosing to locate 
in the respondent’s state or in another state, and how this affected voting intentions for 
the governor. 
 
Our results were striking. The attraction of investment, without knowing the firm-specific 
reasons for the location decision, led 20.9% more respondents to say they would vote for 
the incumbent governor than in states that did not receive the investment, after 
controlling for individual and state determinants. This was especially apparent for 
independent voters (23.6%), whereas partisan voters (strong Democrats or Republicans) 
were less swayed by this information.   
  
We also provided information on tax incentives, asking respondents to consider a 
situation in which the state provided either above-average or below-average incentive 
packages. Again, our findings were clear. For states that received the investment project, 
the governor received an additional 5.6 percentage point vote bonus for offering tax 
incentives from independents. This bears repeating. Independent voters preferred 
governors that provided tax incentives to attract investment to governors who received 
investment without offering generous tax incentives. 
  
When states “lost” our hypothetical investment project, the contrast was even clearer. 
Governors who did not receive the investment were always worse off than governors 
from states who attracted the investment, but the “punishment” was much less severe if 
tax incentives were offered. Put another way, if you are a governor of a state and are 
certain that a firm is going to locate within your borders, offering a tax incentive gets you 
an extra 5.6 percentage points of votes from independent voters. Go ahead and take credit 
for the investment. If you know your state is going to lose the project, the decision is 
easier still. Offering the tax incentives provides an extra 5.3 percentage points of all votes 
and 11.2 percentage points of independents. “It’s not my fault, we offered them tax 
incentives!” 
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 YouGovPolitmetrix uses a sample matching methodology to account for non-response bias in Internet 
surveys and simultaneously generates a nationally representative sample of respondents. We administered 
our questions to 2,000 respondents, who matched the national population demographically. The sample 
matching correction for Polimetrix has been shown to deliver highly representative samples and accurate 
forecasting predictions in repeated studies of this nature. See Lynn Vavreck and Douglas Rivers, “The 2006 
Cooperative Congress Election Study,” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties, 18.4 (2008), pp. 
355-366. 
12 
The findings from the survey indicate two clear points related to public policy. First, the 
tax wars among states, and possibly among countries, are strongly driven by domestic 
politics. Politicians may be trying to take credit for investment that is going to come 
anyway and/or trying to minimize blame for investment that does not come. Even without 
any tax competition, politicians may be taking advantage of voters’ perceptions (or 
misperceptions) of competition. 
  
Second, despite some popular rhetoric against FDI, and specifically Chinese FDI, we find 
strong evidence that there are massive political benefits to attracting FDI.12 Although 
many voters are skeptical of its benefits nationally, they clearly reward politicians for 
attracting investment to their state.  
 
Congressional pollsters have noticed a strange pattern over time. While nobody seems to 
like the institution of Congress or incompetent politicians, survey data (and the 90% 
reelection rate) suggest that voters like their members of Congress. Our findings point to 
an interesting parallel with the perceptions of Americans on FDI: there is some 
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a Results from all voters, sample size 1,944. “In recent years [foreign], [Chinese], [Japanese], companies 
have invested in the United States. Do you think these investments are good for the U.S. Economy?” 
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President Obama’s international tax proposals could go further 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah* 
   
The Obama administration’s 2011 budget proposals include revenues of US$ 122 billion 
over ten years from “international tax reform.” This set of proposals is similar to but 
narrower than the ones advanced by the administration in May 2009, which would have 
raised US$ 210 billion.  
 
The two main proposals are substantially repeated from 2009. The first would indirectly 
limit the deferral opportunity for U.S.-based multinationals by restricting the deductibility 
of interest expense that is allocated to deferred income. Under current law, U.S.-based 
MNEs that earn foreign source active business income through their foreign affiliates 
(CFCs) can defer U.S. tax on such income until the CFCs pay a dividend to their US 
parent corporation. At the same time, the US parent may deduct currently interest 
expense even if it is allocated to the deferred income of the CFCs. The same proposal was 
made in 2009 but applied to a broader category of deductions.  
 
The second proposal restricts the ability of U.S.-based MNEs to repatriate income from 
CFCs in high-tax jurisdictions while continuing to defer tax on income earned by CFCs 
in low-tax jurisdictions. Under current law, dividends paid by CFCs carry with them 
foreign tax credits that are calculated based on a formula that compares the amount of tax 
paid to the CFCs' earnings. The new proposal would calculate the tax paid and the 
amount of credit given based on the pooled earnings of all the CFCs of a MNE, including 
CFCs in low-tax jurisdictions. The result would be a higher U.S. tax burden on the 
repatriated earnings. This proposal was also made in 2009.  
 
These proposals are interesting because they seem to run counter to the prevailing 
international trend. In recent years, jurisdictions such as the U.K. and Japan that used to 
tax their MNEs on a worldwide basis have moved in the direction of territorial taxation 
by exempting dividends paid by CFCs to the parent corporation out of active business 
income but at the same time tightening their CFC anti-abuse provisions. Other OECD 
members such as Germany, France and Canada that have CFC regimes have always 
exempted dividends from active business income. By imposing indirect restrictions on 
deferral and increasing the tax burden on repatriations, the Obama administration risks 
being perceived as putting U.S.-based MNEs at a competitive disadvantage.13  
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However, in my opinion such a view is mistaken, for three reasons. First, there is no 
evidence that U.S. taxation of the foreign source income of U.S. multinationals puts them 
at a disadvantage. Second, our FDI partners tax foreign source income more than we do, 
and that will still be true if the Obama proposals are adopted. Third, even if we want to 
go further and tax U.S. multinationals on all their foreign source income, we could use 
the OECD to coordinate such a move with our FDI partners so that no competitive 
disadvantage would result.  
 
U.S. multinationals have been making the competitive disadvantage argument since 1961, 
when President Kennedy first proposed to tax them on their overseas profits. At that time, 
U.S. multinationals dominated the world. General Motors (GM), to take a painful 
example, had over 40% of the U.S. car market. Since then, other countries have grown, 
and U.S. multinationals face more competition. But there is absolutely no empirical 
evidence that any of the myriad changes to our taxation of foreign profits of U.S. 
multinationals since 1961 has made any difference to their ability to compete. U.S. 
multinationals succeed when they create products or services the world wants to buy, and 
they fail (like GM) when they do not.  
 
Nor is it true that our FDI partners tax their multinationals more lightly. They do refrain 
from taxing dividend distributions from foreign income, but they restrict this to income 
that was either taxed overseas or that has a real connection to the country it was earned 
in. We, on the other hand, tax dividends but give a credit for foreign taxes, so that in most 
cases U.S.-based MNEs do not pay tax on foreign source dividends. And we permit our 
multinationals to defer taxation on a much broader range of income than our foreign 
competitors. For example, U.S. banks and insurance companies are free to set up shop in 
Caribbean tax havens and not pay tax on their earnings there, while our competitors 
would tax these earnings unless you could show a real connection to the country they are 
supposedly earned in. As a result, our multinationals pay less tax on their foreign profits 
than their competitors, and this will not change if the Obama proposals are adopted. 
 
The Obama proposals could have gone much farther. They envisage raising US$ 58 
billion over ten years from partially taxing foreign profits, while adopting the Kennedy 
administration proposal to tax all foreign profits would have raised US$ 250 billion. But 
even that supposedly radical step could be achieved if we were willing to coordinate it 
with our FDI partners, most of whom adopted their rules to tax foreign income following 
our lead. Such coordination is possible, as shown by the OECD adoption of a binding 
treaty that embodies the principles of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (before the 
OECD treaty, U.S.-based MNEs were the only ones subject to FCPA and were at a 
competitive disadvantage).  
 
U.S. multinationals currently earn a third of their overseas profits in three low-tax 
countries (Bermuda, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Eight of the top ten locations for 
U.S. multinational profits have an effective tax rate of less than 10%. The Obama 
proposals represent a very cautious first step toward making U.S. multinationals pay their 
fair share of the tax burden, and toward leveling the playing field with small U.S. 
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businesses that are subject to the full 35% tax and that are our principal job creators. 
Congress should enact them as soon as possible.  








One important novelty of the Lisbon Treaty, ratified by the EU in December 2009, is the 
inclusion of FDI within the scope of Common Commercial Policy, implying a transfer of 
certain FDI competences from the member states to the EU, which now has the ability to 
conclude international investment treaties.14 Until now, member states had full 
competence over FDI, and the role of EU institutions was very limited. It remains to be 
seen how the new Treaty will be interpreted and implemented in light of the difficult 
legal and political questions that this development raises.  
 
While the Treaty does not propose any change regarding FDI promotion competences, 
perhaps this is also the opportunity to take a more active, coordinated approach to FDI 
promotion at the EU level. Within the European Single Market, member states fiercely 
compete against each other and have steadily increased the scale and scope of resources 
devoted to national and sub-national investment promotion agencies (IPAs). While 
competitive FDI promotion will remain, a critical challenge now is to increase 
cooperation among member states to attract more FDI into the EU as a whole.  
 
There are several reasons for this suggestion. There might be information failures to be 
addressed at the EU level: for example, the potential for cross-border activities by foreign 
multinational enterprises across the EU, the incentive schemes available at the EU level 
or the mechanisms to engage in European research networks and to benefit from 
European R&D funding. The sharp decline in FDI inflows in recent years also supports a 
coordinated EU approach to FDI promotion: according to UNCTAD, in 2009, FDI into 
the EU fell by 28%, following a deeper 40% decrease in 2008. This does not necessarily 
mean that the EU is losing FDI competitiveness – for example the U.S. experienced a 
similar decline – but it is still reason for concern. What’s clear is that the share of 
developed countries in FDI inflows has fallen significantly relative to the share of 
developing economies, within a context of shrinking global FDI flows.15 Moreover, the 
prospects for the near future are also worrisome; only four EU countries appear among 
the 15 most attractive FDI locations in 2009-2011.16 The most attractive country is China, 
followed by the U.S.; the first EU country is the U.K., in sixth position. Besides the 
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necessary reforms to improve the business climate, it therefore seems clear that a more 
efficient promotion of the EU as a regional bloc would be desirable.  
 
In fact, several initiatives have emerged along these lines in recent years. For example, 
the European Attractiveness Scoreboard, launched in 2007 as a joint initiative of the 
governmental IPAs of France and Germany, gives insight into Europe's investment 
climate and provides a comprehensive overview of Europe's business strengths. The 
benchmark study compares Europe with competing investment locations, including the 
US, China, Japan, India, and Brazil, based on a comprehensive range of economic and 
social indicators. 
 
More recently, the EU chapter of the World Association of Investment Promotion 
Agencies (WAIPA) has also taken action. WAIPA brings together national and sub-
national IPAs from all over the world; its EU chapter, currently chaired by Invest in 
Spain, comprises all the EU member states except Luxembourg. Invest in Spain has been 
preparing a first draft of a promotional document entitled “Why Europe?” that has been 
presented and discussed with the other EU IPAs. This document aims at becoming a 
marketing piece for the EU as a whole and to serve as an investment guide for 
international dissemination.  
 
These initiatives should be seen as just the initial phase of intra-EU cooperation, focusing 
primarily on the elaboration of promotional documents and investment guides. The next 
(and more controversial) question is whether the EU should further develop common FDI 
promotion policies and tools. This could be done under the umbrella of an EU IPA, akin 
to the U.S.’ Invest in America. 
 
Like Invest in America, the EU IPA should focus solely on efforts to promote the EU as a 
whole. It could develop a website and materials to provide information about the 
strengths of the EU in different sectors or about the regulatory regime and incentives 
available at the EU-level. It could provide support to foreign investors, for example 
helping to find suitable business partners or suppliers or to comply with EU-level 
competition regulations. It could also aim at stimulating collaboration and synergies 
among national IPAs, for example by organizing joint seminars and missions abroad. 
Finally, it could play an important policy advocacy role in Brussels, by suggesting 
possible solutions to the business climate concerns of foreign investors. It should always 
remain neutral and refer foreign investors to the different national contact points when 
asked about specific locations within the EU. This agency would not need a big resource 
structure; for example, Invest in America operates with around seven employees.  
 
The first priority of common EU investment promotion should be to communicate better 
the strengths of the EU as a location for innovation and R&D, since many of the recent 
developments of the so-called European Research Area remain obscure to foreign 
investors. The EU aspiration to become “the most competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world” requires not only encouraging European companies to invest more 
in R&D, but also attracting the R&D activity of foreign multinational enterprises. 
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The key challenge ahead will be to balance the natural competition among member states 









Over the past 12 months, large-scale acquisitions of farmland in Africa, Latin America, 
Central Asia and Southeast Asia have made headlines in a flurry of media reports across 
the world. Lands that only a short time ago seemed of little outside interest are now being 
sought by international investors to the tune of hundreds of thousands of hectares.  
 
Trends and drivers 
An article recently published in The Economist suggested that foreign investors have 
acquired or sought some 15-20 million hectares of farmland in poorer countries since 
2006, quoting estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute.17  
 
The accuracy of these estimates is hard to assess, but evidence points toward significant 
levels of activity and upward trends over the past five years. In four African countries 
alone (Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali), approved land allocations to foreign 
investors since 2004 amount to over 1.4 million hectares of land (just below the size of a 
country like Swaziland or Kuwait); this excludes allocations below 1,000 hectares, 
allocations to nationals and pending negotiations. Due to incomplete datasets, this is a 
conservative figure – and it is much higher if deals still under negotiation in the four 
countries are included.  
 
Approved allocations include a 452,500-hectare biofuel project in Madagascar, a 
150,000-hectare livestock project in Ethiopia, and a 100,000-hectare irrigation project in 
Mali. All four countries experience upward trends in both project numbers and allocated 
land areas, and evidence suggests that investment levels will grow in future. Private 
sector deals are more common than government-to-government ones, though 
governments are using a range of tools indirectly to support private deals, and levels of 
government-owned investments are significant and probably growing.  
 
Concerns about food security (compounded by water shortages in key investor countries 
and by the food price hikes of 2008) and the biofuels boom are key drivers, but other 
factors are also at play – such as business opportunities linked to expectations of rising 
food prices, agricultural commodity demand for industry, and policy reforms in recipient 
countries.  
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Mitigating risks, seizing opportunities 
This new and fast-evolving context creates risks and opportunities. Increased investment 
may bring macro-level benefits (GDP growth, greater government revenues), and create 
opportunities for raising local living standards. Investors may bring capital, technology, 
know-how, infrastructure and market access, and may play an important role in 
catalyzing economic development in rural areas.  
 
But as outside interest increases and as governments or markets make land available to 
prospecting investors, land acquisitions may result in local people losing access to the 
resources on which they depend – land, but also water, wood and grazing. National laws 
may not have sufficient mechanisms to protect local rights and take account of local 
interests, livelihoods and welfare. Insecure resource rights, inaccessible registration 
procedures, compensation limited to loss of improvements like crops and trees, and 
legislative gaps often undermine the position of local people. 
 
Ultimately, the extent to which international land deals seize opportunities and mitigate 
risks depends on each project’s terms and conditions: how risks are assessed and 
mitigated (for instance, with regard to project location), what business models are used 
(from plantations to contract farming through to various forms of equity participation by 
local people), how costs and benefits are shared (including the distribution of food 
produced between home and host countries), and who decides on these issues and how.  
 
Unpacking land deals 
While outright purchases appear common in Latin America and Eastern Europe, land 
leases are predominant in Africa – not least due to restrictions under national laws. 
Leases are often granted by host governments, though deals with local leaders are 
common for instance in Ghana, and some deals involve separate contracts with host 
governments and local people. A recent contract from Madagascar entails a combination 
of lease and contract farming arrangements, including through a direct deal with 13 
associations of local landholders.  
 
Lease durations range from short term to 99 years, and are associated with transfers of 
water rights. Land fees and other monetary transfers tend to be relatively low, linked to 
efforts to attract investment, perceived low opportunity costs, and lack of well-established 
land markets. Host country benefits mainly involve investor commitments on investment 
levels, job creation and infrastructure development – for example, with regard to the 
construction  of irrigation systems.  
 
Overall, however, some land deals appear rather short and simple, particularly compared 
to contracts in other sectors such as extractive industries. Key issues like promoting 
business models that maximize local content, strengthening mechanisms to monitor or 
enforce compliance with investor commitments, maximizing government revenues and 
clarifying their distribution, as well as balancing food security concerns in both home and 
host countries, may be dealt with by vague provisions if at all. 
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Lack of transparency is a major challenge in many negotiations, with little public access 
to information and decision-making. This includes many government-to-government 
negotiations, which may be expected to be subject to greater public scrutiny. Lack of 
transparency and of checks and balances in contract negotiations create a breeding 
ground for corruption and deals that do not maximize the public interest. 
 
What needs to happen 
Trends in foreign direct investment in land for agriculture reflect deep global economic 
and social transformations, with potentially profound implications for the future of world 
agriculture. The role of food in human consumption makes it fundamentally different 
from other commodities. In many parts of the world, land is central to identity, 
livelihoods and food security, and decisions taken today will have major repercussions 
for many, for decades to come. While bilateral negotiations are unfolding fast, there is a 
need for vigorous public debate in recipient countries, so as to base decisions on strategic 
thinking about the future of agriculture, the place of large and small-scale farming within 
it, and the role and nature of outside investment.  
 
Where international land deals emerge as a way forward, governments must ask hard 
questions about the investor’s capacity to deliver on very ambitious projects. Sensible 
regulation, skillfully negotiated contracts and robust social and environmental impact 
assessments are key. Host governments must create incentives to promote inclusive 
business models that integrate rural smallholders and family farms, and ensure the respect 
of commitments on investment levels, job creation, infrastructure development, public 
revenues, environmental protection, safeguards in land takings, and other aspects. Some 
recipient countries are themselves food insecure, and robust arrangements must protect 
local food security, particularly in times of food crisis.  
 
Although extractive industry projects are often controversial, contractual practice in this 
large-scale, capital-intensive sector may also provide some insights, particularly as the 
size and value of land deals increases.18 This might include precise local content 
requirements (employment, inputs) that evolve over project duration to increase local 
percentages and extend them to higher-value content (e.g., skilled labor); provisions on 
local capacity building (training, technology transfer); specific safeguards on land takings 
and environmental damage; sophisticated revenue sharing mechanisms giving host states 
a sizeable share of project revenues, possibly increasing it over project duration; and 
efforts to improve transparency in contracts and revenue management, including through 
open tendering and civil society oversight (under the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative). 
 
As interest in land grows, efforts must be stepped up in many countries to secure local 
land rights, including customary rights, using collective land registration where 
appropriate and ensuring the principle of free, prior and informed consent, robust 
compensation regimes, the provision of legal aid, and good governance in land tenure and 
administration
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Improving infrastructure or lowering taxes to attract foreign direct 
investment? 
 
Christian Bellak and Markus Leibrecht* 
 
A crucial challenge to all countries in the current economic crisis is to stimulate 
investment, including foreign direct investment. Countries striving to attract FDI often 
resort to two types of policies: improving infrastructure or lowering taxes, as a means of 
attracting new FDI, or keeping existing FDI. Indeed, recent empirical studies (e.g., 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; Bellak et al. 2009) confirmed that both lower taxes and 
improved infrastructure exert a considerable influence upon multinational enterprises’ 
decision to invest in a particular country, when controlling for other important location 
factors (including market size and labor costs). 
 
Excellent infrastructure is not only a key determinant for foreign investors but also helps 
to improve the competitiveness of domestic firms. High taxes – corporate income taxes in 
particular – are often seen as a deterrent to MNEs, as they directly reduce their after-tax 
profits. Alternative locations with a lower tax burden – and otherwise similar investment 
conditions – can change the investment decisions of multinational enterprises (e.g., de 
Mooij and Ederveen 2008). 
 
Policy-makers are pressed by limited budgets to find the optimal policy-mix to maximize 
FDI at a minimum cost to the government and taxpayers. Given the important effects of 
improved infrastructure and lower taxes on FDI, policy-makers must consider two 
important questions when designing their policies:  
 
1. What is the relative importance of lower taxes and improved infrastructure for 
attracting FDI?  
 
2. How does the possible negative effect of high taxes on FDI change if a country invests 
more in infrastructure? This is an important question, since often both policies, (i.e., 
lowering taxes and investing in infrastructure), cannot be achieved simultaneously, since 
the former are required to fund part of the latter. It is worth noting though, that in most 
cases infrastructure is not funded solely by taxes on mobile factors but via general budget 
revenues including debt. 
 
The empirical study by Bellak et al. (2009) revealed that taxes are somewhat less 
important as a location factor (standardized coefficient of -0.25) than infrastructure 
(0.27). Moreover, the study revealed that, among the various types of infrastructure, 
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information and communication infrastructure is more important (0.45) than transport 
infrastructure (0.19) and electricity generation capacity (0.06). Moreover, the significant 
impacts of taxes and infrastructure are robust not only across different specifications but 
also with respect to countries included in the analysis. Concerning the latter, the study is 
based on FDI measured by bilateral FDI outflows of seven major home countries of FDI 
– Austria (AUT), Germany (DEU), France, Great-Britain (GBR), United States (U.S.), 
the Netherlands (NLD) and Italy (ITA) – to eight important Central and Eastern European 
host countries – Czech Republic (CZE), Hungary (HUN), Poland (POL), Slovakia 
(SVK), Slovenia (SVN), Bulgaria (BGR), (Croatia) HVN and Romania (ROM) – during 
the period from 1995 to 2004. The gross national product at current market prices per 
head of population was as follows in 2004, in € 1,000: AUT: 28.3, DEU: 27.1, FRA: 
26.8, GBR: 30, U.S.: 32, NLD: 31, ITA: 23.8, CZE: 8.2, HUN: 7.7, POL: 5.2, SVK: 6.1, 
SVN: 13.4, BGR: 2.6, HVN: 7.2, ROM: 2.7. The EU average value was 21.7.19 
Therefore, the results are derived based on a set of countries with a wide range of 
development. Finally, it has to be stressed that the host countries of FDI included are 
rather heterogeneous in both key variables, the tax burden levied on FDI as well as the 
endowment with infrastructure. 
 
With respect to the second question, the study also measured the interaction between 
taxes and infrastructure, and the analysis shows that the negative impact high taxes have 
on FDI are negatively correlated with a country’s infrastructure endowment; in fact, the 
negative effect of taxes even vanishes for countries with relatively high levels of 
infrastructure (see also Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007). Put differently, infrastructure 
generates specific advantages of a location, which allow higher taxes on profits from FDI 
without discouraging such investment.  
 
Conclusions 
The policy implications of this important result for a country seeking to attract FDI 
(especially countries currently debating the relative merits of cutting taxes versus 
increased spending, such as the United States) actually depend on the tax regime of the 
country. 
 
High tax countries should continue to invest in infrastructure, and do not have to 
participate in the “race to the bottom” in tax rates, as well-developed infrastructure will 
negate the potentially negative effects of high taxes on attracting and keeping FDI. 
Countries with an above average infrastructure endowment can – at least in part – afford 
to finance their infrastructure by taxing corporations. In other words, a policy of 
contributing to improvements in productivity investments in production-related 
infrastructure in fact compensates MNEs for higher taxes.  
 
The remaining policy issue for such governments is how much they should invest in 
infrastructure and which types of infrastructure should a country focus on. As mentioned 
above, information and communication infrastructure has been shown to be the most 
effective for attracting FDI, followed by transport infrastructure. Moreover, information 
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and communication infrastructure is shown to be more important than corporate taxes as 
determinant of FDI (standardized coefficients of 0.45 and -0.25, respectively). Thus, it 
would be better to invest in information and communication infrastructure than lowering 
corporate taxes to attract and keep FDI. 
 
For low tax countries with an inferior infrastructure endowment, like many developing 
countries and transition economies, the importance of tax policy is still relatively 
important, since the infrastructure endowment does not compensate for the costs of high 
taxes. The silver lining, however, is that FDI does react to changes in tax rates, so such 
countries can adjust their tax policies to attract more FDI. In the short term, such 
countries will likely be most successful in attracting FDI by relying on a strategy of low 
corporate income taxes. In the longer term, however, these countries should harness the 
positive contribution of FDI in their countries to invest in improving their infrastructure. 
 
These results are of relevance to the current economic crisis, where countries have been 
scrambling to design stimulus packages that will increase investment, by domestic firms 
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Can the United States remain an attractive host for FDI in the auto 
industry? New labor policy and flexible production 
 
Terutomo Ozawa* 
                                       
President Obama has been supporting a new bill, the Employee Free Choice Act, 
designed to promote the labor unions’ drive for unionization. This bill, if enacted, will 
surely be a big boon for unions as it helps enlarge their membership, enhance their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis businesses, and enrich their coffers to wield political clout. An 
important issue here, however, is how such reinforced unionism contributes to the U.S.’s 
much needed industrial competitiveness and employment – and, more specifically, how 
this new policy will affect the U.S. as a host to FDI in the auto industry.  
 
In 2008, General Motors (GM) yielded its world’s top position to Toyota. Unfortunately, 
Detroit’s woes have been caused in significant part by the ever-restrictive work rules and 
legacy costs (i.e., generous wages and retirement and healthcare benefits) obtained by the 
United Auto Workers union (UAW). For this, however, the UAW alone should not be 
blamed. It has been acting in its own interest within an institutional setup that was created 
by the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, a law that was legislated amid the 
Great Depression and in understandable sympathy with the plight of massively laid-off 
workers, the victims of then unbridled capitalism. U.S. unionism was thus fostered by 
Congress as a way of giving workers countervailing power against “uncaring” 
management that considered them mere cogs in the machine. Unfortunately, however, 
labor and management have ever since been trapped in a relationship that was inherently 
antagonistic and adversarial – that is, a sort of an institutional curse. True, such unionism 
helped secure unprecedented benefits for tens of thousands of U.S. workers – so long as 
Detroit enjoyed unchallenged competitiveness. The UAW and automakers both shared 
the spoils of industrial dominance.  
  
It was, however, not long before the rest of the industrialized world had caught up, 
altering the competitive environment. Most importantly, Fordism-cum-Taylorism came to 
be outcompeted by flexible production that was initiated by Toyota. Toyotism is now 
being emulated across industries worldwide – even the U.S. Postal Service has been 
endeavoring to adopt flexible techniques in its efforts to raise efficiency and to serve 
customers better.  
 
Auto FDI in the U.S. (known as “transplants”) is centered in non-unionized southern 
states. Foreign multinationals there can produce automobiles cost-effectively largely 
because of a flexible workplace that is unencumbered by restrictive union rules. Japanese 
                                                 
*
 The author wishes to thank Mark Barenberg and Hugh Patrick for their helpful comments on this chapter. 
It was first published as a Perspective on October 26, 2009. 
27 
transplants in particular thrive on Toyota-style management and production. They are 
known for their workplace “democratization” where the supervisory structure is flattened 
and where both management and workers share common facilities (such as parking lots, 
cafeterias, and restrooms) and common activities (group calisthenics and recreations), all 
designed to promote informal communication and a teamwork spirit. The 
pay/compensation gap between executives and the rank-and-file is much smaller than that 
in comparable U.S. companies. Also, the transplants treat workers as “brain” workers 
who perform multi-tasks on a rotation basis to avoid monotonous single task assignments, 
and actively suggest ways to improve on work practices (i.e., kaizen approach). This is in 
sharp contrast to the status of workers as “brawn” workers who are assigned to simplified 
repetitive tasks under mass production (as satirized by Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times). 
Moreover, they minimize layoffs and furloughs during a downturn, retaining and 
retraining workers. Also, flexible production relies on “just-in-time” delivery (instead of 
“just-in-case” inventories) of parts and components. The workers at the transplants have 
so far been turning down the UAW’s offer for unionization. 
 
Some of these practices are emulated by U.S. automakers, but their management culture 
in general and the restrictive work rules in particular are in their way. True, the New 
United Motor Manufacturing’s labor union accepted many of Toyotist techniques, and 
the factory’s efficiency became far better than its GM counterparts. But it has never 
attained Toyota’s (or the transplants’) benchmark and remained unprofitable – and is set 
to close despite an ardent plea from Governor Schwarzenegger to save it. Also, from the 
start, Saturn’s UAW collaborated to eliminate most of its work rules, though decried by 
its traditionalists. In 2004, however, Saturn’s union voted to dismantle such a Toyotist 
arrangement and went back to the standard UAW contract. It is headed for closure unless 
a white knight is found.  
 
All in all, the transplants’ competitiveness derives fundamentally from Toyotism, though 
“no legacy costs” certainly help. Flexible production is not intended to exploit labor but 
to create a larger pie to share with workers. Wagner Act-enabled collective bargaining 
disregards the size of a pie, even if it shrinks because of workplace inflexibility and 
disruptive strikes. Actually, the transplants pay higher compensation (about 20% more) 
than the national average – currently employing more than 400,000 Americans at the 
average annual pay of US$ 63,538.20 At least, southern members of Congress, governors, 
and mayors – and workers themselves – understand the benefits of flexible production 
and are eager to attract more auto FDI so as to create well-paid manufacturing jobs 
locally. This is the reason why even some Democrats in Congress are opposed to the 
EFCA.   
 
It is critical for lawmakers – and management, as well as labor – all to realize that the 
antagonistic mode of labor relations institutionalized by the Wagner Act is utterly 
outdated. A more cooperative relationship is called for. Simply expanding the power of 
unions by making unionization easier cannot enhance the U.S.’s competitiveness. Since 
Detroit is already unionized, Detroit South will naturally be the new target of 
unionization. Detroit-style unionization discourages foreign multinationals from coming 
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to the U.S. and encourages the U.S.’s own companies to outsource production overseas. It 
is high time for the President and Congress to treat unions not merely as an electorate but 
as a vital economic player who can contribute to industrial efficiency and to devise 
policies for flexible labor. As part of the Detroit bailout conditionality, the UAW agreed 
to allow for flexibility and cooperation. This type of mandate, at least, ought to be 












Outward investment by Trans-Latin enterprises: reasons for optimism 
 
Michael Mortimore and Carlos Razo * 
 
Despite the current economic crisis, outward FDI (OFDI) by Latin American and 
Caribbean enterprises continued its upward trend in 2008 (annex figure 1). OFDI by 
firms in the region reached nearly US$ 35 billion in 2008, an increase of 42% with 
respect to 2007 (ECLAC, 2009a). However, several of the factors that fostered such 
growth have recently changed, possibly affecting OFDI prospects for 2009. This Chapter 
briefly explores these changes and their potential effects on firms’ investing behavior, as 
well as some important countervailing factors that may cushion the effects of the 
economic crisis on Latin American firms’ investment plans.  
 
The recent increase is the result of the accelerated efforts of some Latin American 
companies (Trans-Latins) to expand operations beyond their borders (annex table 1). 
Brazilian firms led this trend, as their OFDI in 2008 accounted for over 60% of the 
region’s total. Chile was the second highest investor, followed by Venezuela (annex 
figure 2). In contrast, Mexico’s Trans-Latins were severely hit by the economic downturn 
in the North American market. This was manifested in the sharp contraction of the 
country’s OFDI from over US$ 8 billion in 2007 to US$ 686 million in 2008, although it 
did recover in early 2009. 
 
The internationalization trend of Trans-Latin enterprises resulted from a combination of 
factors: global and regional economic growth trends,21 increases in productivity and 
innovation, knowledge transfer, improved supply chain capabilities, high international 
commodity prices, improved access to credit, and strong corporate profits among others. 
A number of these conditions have now changed. GDP in Latin America is expected to 
contract by 1.9% in 2009 (ECLAC, 2009b) and, coupled with falling commodity prices, 
tightening credit markets and increasing debt levels, will undoubtedly make investment 
more difficult for most Latin American firms.  
 
The global crisis has already hit some of the iconic Trans-Latin corporations hard. For 
example, CEMEX, the Mexican cement giant burdened with a US$ 14.5 billion loan for 
the acquisition of the Australian firm Rinker in 2007 and most of its assets concentrated 
in the deteriorated North American market, was forced to cut capital investment by over 
50% in 2009 and attempted to sell assets to pay off its current debt (ECLAC, 2009a). 
Sudamericana de Vapores (Chile), the biggest shipping company in the region, searched 
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for buyers for certain operations in order to acquire cash. Sadia (Brazil), the region’s 
biggest chicken producer, had losses of over US$ 800 million in the last quarter of 2008, 
mostly as a result of investment in financial derivatives (America Economía, 2009). In 
other words, some Trans-Latins are feeling the effect of the current crisis quite severely.  
 
Nevertheless, there are some powerful countervailing factors that may keep the Trans-
Latin expansion going, especially by firms with low debt levels and good liquidity 
positions. For instance, Latin America, the main market of the Trans-Latins, has been 
contracting at a slower pace than other regions since the crisis began, making it more 
attractive for investment.  
 
Investment in natural resources, an important niche of Trans-Latin companies, usually 
focuses on long-run prospects. Projects in oil, gas and mining mature slowly, making 
some investments relatively less sensitive to the current recession. In the oil sector, 
Petrobras (Brazil) announced at the beginning of 2009 a rise in its investment plan for the 
next four years22 and Ecopetrol (Colombia) increased its planned investment by 35% over 
2008 (PODER, 2009). 
 
The expansion of Trans-Latins will also continue in sectors in which the income-
elasticity of demand is relatively low (e.g., products for mass consumption). For instance, 
Bimbo (Mexico) has acquired the assets of the baked products branch of Weston 
(Canada) in the US (annex table 2). New investment will take place in countries or 
markets with better prospects. As an example, the Chilean retailer, Cencosud y Falabella, 
will probably continue expanding its business to countries such as Peru, Colombia and 
Brazil.  
  
A third factor that may encourage Trans-Latin outward investment has to do with the 
steps taken by Latin American governments to confront the current economic crisis.23 
One of the most widely used measures is the promotion of investment in infrastructure. 
Such measures may trigger investment not only by firms in the construction business, 
such as the Mexican firms IDEAL and ICA, or Brazilian companies like Odebrecht and 
Camargo Correa, but also by some natural-resource-based manufacturers, such as the iron 
and steel producers Gerdau (Brazil) and Ternium (part of the Argentine Techint group).  
  
Also worth mentioning because of its resilience in the current crisis, and the important 
role played by one of the biggest Trans-Latins in it, is the information technology (IT) 
sector. Digital convergence obliges providers to invest in mobile and Internet 
technologies and networks to remain competitive in the region. In this regard, América 
Móvil (Mexico) is expected to invest another US$ 3 billion in the region.  
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All this said, it should nonetheless be emphasized that there are no guarantees that 
outward investment by Latin American firms will continue growing or will outpace 
investment by firms from other regions. Whether that happens depends largely on the 
particular circumstances of a relatively small number of firms in a handful of countries in 
Latin America. This corporate concentration is greater than in other regions and the 
corporate response thus depends on fewer investors.  
  
Still, first indications are positive. According to the latest available figures, although 
OFDI from the top regional investors as a group is down by 28% in the first quarter of 
2009, compared to the same period in 2008, some countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia 
and Mexico) have registered increases in their OFDI (annex table 2).  
  
A number of favorable impacts of OFDI on the home country have been identified, 
especially with regard to international competitiveness. If governments in the region wish 
to see their OFDI increase they are advised to design and implement more focused 
national policies for that purpose. Such initiatives range from eliminating barriers to 
OFDI (relaxing controls and raising financial limits for investments abroad) to actively 
promoting OFDI as a strategic tool to integrate with global markets and production 
systems (by way of the provision of information, matchmaking, incentives and insurance 
coverage, etc.).24 In this, Latin America and the Caribbean is far behind the policy 





Figure 1. Latin America and the Caribbean: net OFDI flows, 1992-2008 (US$ billion) 
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Figure 2. Latin America and the Caribbean, OFDI by principal investor countries, 2007-2008 (US$ 
million) 
 
Source: ECLAC, 2009a. 
 
 
Table 1. The top 25 non-financial companies and groups of Latin America and the Caribbean with 
investments outside of their country of origin, ranked by 2008 sales 
(US$ million) 
 
  Company Sales Country Sector 
1 PDVSA 115,446 Venezuela Petroleum/gas 
2 Petrobras 111,967 Brazil Petroleum/gas 
3 América Móvil/Telmex 33,960 Mexico Telecommunications 
4 Cia Vale Do Rio Doce 30,184 Brazil Mining 
5 
TECHINT (Tenaris, 
Ternium) 20,598 Argentina 
Steel, steel pipes, construction, 
others 
6 Gerdau 17,932 Brazil Iron and steel/ metallurgy 
7 Cemex 17,582 Mexico Cement 
8 Codelco 14,425 Chile Mining 
9 GrupoJBS 12,983 Brazil Food products 
10 Ecopetrol 12,283 Colombia Petroleum/gas 
11 Coca-Cola FEMSA 12,147 Mexico Beverages 
12 ENAP 10,095 Chile Petroleum/gas 
13 Cencosud 9,459 Chile Commerce 
14 Grupo Alfa 8,400 Mexico Various diversified 
15 Grupo Camargo Correa 7,175 Brazil Diversified 
16 Cia. Siderurgica Nacional 7,118 Brazil Iron and steel/ metallurgy 
17 Falabella 6,132 Chile Commerce 
18 Grupo Bimbo 5,951 Mexico Food products 
19 Embraer 5,725 Brazil Aerospace industry 
20 Grupo Modelo 5,448 Mexico Beverages 
21 Sadia 5,341 Brazil Food products 
22 TAM 5,201 Brazil Transportation/logistics 
23 Oderbrecht 4,950 Brazil Construction, others 





Table 2. Latin America’s top six foreign investors, OFDI first quarter 2008 and 2009 (US$ million) 
 








Argentina  346 393 14 
Brazila 7,537 944 -87 
Chile 1,959 2,193 12 
Colombia 384 1,168 204 
Mexico -501 2,939 … 
Venezuela 1,068 80 -93 
Total 10,793 7,717 -28 
Source: The authors, on the basis of official figures as of 20 July 2009. 
aReported OFDI for Brazil covers the period January to May 2009.  
 
Table 3. Main acquisitions by Trans-Latins outside their countries of origin, announced or concluded in 
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Spain 344 Paper/pulp 
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How BRIC MNEs deal with international political risk 
 
Premila Nazareth Satyanand* 
   
Hitherto, political risk has worried developed country multinational enterprises investing 
in developing country markets. But as more emerging market firms invest overseas, they 
too must grapple with this subject. World Investment and Political Risk 2009 looks at this 
issue for the first time and finds that Brazilian, Russian, Indian, and Chinese (BRIC) 
firms appear to worry more about political risk than global counterparts.25 Though these 
results are based on a small sample of 90 of the largest BRIC investors, they are thought-
provoking nonetheless. 
 
Already, emerging market FDI outflows have tripled from US$ 100 billion in 2000 to 
US$ 350 billion in 2008 according to UNCTAD, driven largely by burgeoning 
investments from Brazil, Russia, India, and China.26  Although the bulk of this FDI has 
gone into developed economies, BRIC firms have also stepped up the size and spread of 
their investments in other emerging markets.  
 
Protecting against political risk 
As mentioned earlier, survey data suggests that BRIC firms see political risk as more of a 
concern than global counterparts when investing in emerging economies. This is not 
surprising, since BRIC firms invest heavily even in those developing economies they 
consider among “the world’s five most politically risky," in contrast to global 
counterparts who stay clear of the markets they consider most unstable. Brazil, for 
instance, lists Venezuela as one of its five key emerging markets, even while ranking it as 
one of the world’s five most high-risk markets. China does the same with Indonesia; 
India with Russia and Africa; and Russia with Kazakhstan and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Also important is that the BRIC sample also had a higher percentage 
of natural resource firms, which are more vulnerable to political risk.  
 
BRIC firms, like their global counterparts, worry most about breach of contract and 
transfer and convertibility restrictions. But Russian and Brazilian firms worry most about 
breach of contract; Chinese firms about war and civil disturbance; and Indian firms about 
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transfer and convertibility restrictions. Also, while just 9% of Indian firms worry about 
expropriation, an average of 26% of Brazilian, Russian and Chinese firms do.  
 
BRIC firms, like global counterparts, are confident about their ability to assess political 
risk and implement existing mitigation strategies.27 However, they are far less so about 
anticipating new political risks, evaluating new mitigation strategies and assigning roles 
for political risk management. They also rely on the same non-formal political risk 
mitigation strategies as global counterparts, according them different priorities. While 
global firms rely heavily on engagement with host governments and risk analysis, the 
Russian firms surveyed rely most on host country engagement, the Chinese on risk 
analysis and the Indians and Brazilians on local tie-ups. Half the Brazilian sample also 
relies on scenario planning. 
  
BRIC MNEs and political risk going forward  
Like global counterparts, few Brazilian, Indian and Chinese firms purchase political risk 
insurance (PRI), but Russian firms rely heavily upon it. More significant, 27% of the 
BRIC sample said they were unfamiliar with PRI products and 48% pointed to the lack of 
appropriate offerings, double the percentages in the global sample. Some BRIC firms said 
that current PRI offerings define political risk too narrowly to be of practical use. They 
had thus purchased it only under pressure from financiers. Some said they were deterred 
by PRI’s high cost and cumbersome contracting.  
 
Equally significant, some said that current PRI thinking does not take adequate 
cognizance of the types of “political” risk challenges they confront. Key among these is 
the fear of sudden policy and regulatory shift in developed markets, which are core to 
their global competitive strategy and where they have billions of dollars invested. India’s 
IT globalizers, for instance, have been hurt by sudden restrictions in U.S. visa and 
outsourcing-related rules. Earlier, developed markets were completely “safe”, but they 
are now subject to worrying protectionist pressures. A sudden reversal in established 
business rules can abruptly disrupt a global business model, causing as much if not more 
of a loss as expropriation or terrorism in a less strategic emerging market. This said, 53% 
of BRIC firms said they would consider political risk insurance going forward, with 
Chinese and Indian firms highly enthusiastic, in contrast to just 40% of global 
respondents. 
 
Home country governments could respond in two ways. First, they could establish or 
expand political risk protection for their globalizing firms. While global private sector 
insurers and international donors offer such protection, many BRIC globalizers find their 
government agencies more responsive to their needs. They also need to more pro-actively 
market their PRI offerings, as do private PRI players. Second is to build local private 
insurers’ ability to provide PRI cover by permitting them to enter into reinsurance 
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agreements with overseas insurers. As yet, few emerging market insurers have 
independently offered such protection, given that PRI is a specialized product, their 




What will an appreciation of China’s currency do to inward and outward 
FDI? 
 
Karl P. Sauvant and Ken Davies* 
 
What will an appreciation of the Chinese yuan do to China’s inward and outward direct 
investment? The discussion so far has been almost exclusively about the impact on 
China’s trade balance. But it is at least as important to see what effect it may have on the 
country’s inward foreign direct investment (IFDI), which plays such a crucial role in 
China’s economic development, and its outward FDI (OFDI), which is receiving 
increased attention worldwide.28 
 
China has been the developing world’s largest recipient of IFDI since the mid-1990s, 
attracting US$ 95 billion in 2009.29 A revaluation of the yuan will make it more 
expensive for foreign firms to establish themselves (or expand) in China (the world’s 
most dynamic market), giving an advantage to foreign firms already established there 
over new entrants. At the same time, exports of foreign affiliates, which account for 54% 
of total exports,30 will become less competitive internationally, although the increased 
costs will be partly offset by lower costs of imported inputs. Foreign affiliates can also 
expect to repatriate higher profits from sales in China in terms of their own currencies.  
 
However, the most notable development of recent years has been the take-off of the 
country’s OFDI since the government in 2000 adopted the “go global” policy 
encouraging Chinese firms to invest overseas.31 China’s OFDI doubled from US$ 12 
billion in 200532 to US$ 27 billion in 2007, and then doubled again the following year, to 
reach US$ 56 billion.33 Outflows continued to rise to US$ 57 billion in 2009, even as 
world FDI flows collapsed by 50%. In 2009, China was the world’s fifth largest outward 
investor.  
 
The increasing international competitiveness of Chinese firms and an encouraging 
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government policy have been the main drivers of this surge. The 20% revaluation of 
China’s currency against the U.S. dollar in 2005-2008 undoubtedly provided a favorable 
condition facilitating this in the case of host countries whose currencies did not also 
appreciate against the U.S. dollar. There is ample evidence in the academic literature that 
a weaker exchange rate induces increased IFDI.34 
  
China’s OFDI is poised to grow sharply again in 2010, judging by the first half of the 
year, when it was rising at an annual rate of 44%.35 Revaluation would accelerate this 
trend. This is precisely what happened with Japan after the yen was revalued by over 
50% against the US dollar between 1985 and 1987, following the 2005 Plaza Accord.36 
Japan’s OFDI tippled from US$ 6.5 billion in 1984 to US$ 19.5 billion in 1986, peaking 
at US$ 48 billion in 1990.37 
 
A renewed yuan appreciation would boost China’s OFDI growth even further by 
lowering the cost of overseas assets for Chinese firms, which have strong cash reserves 
from both retained earnings and large-scale state credit allocations that put them in a 
position to invest internationally. Like competitors elsewhere, they need to invest abroad 
to acquire a portfolio of locational assets to protect and increase their international 
competitiveness through better access to skills, technology, natural resources, and 
markets.  
 
Revaluation would combine with already rising wage pressures inside China. Labor-
intensive firms in China’s coastal provinces are under pressure to seek lower labor cost 
by either investing in China’s interior of abroad. Already more than 700 Chinese 
affiliates have been established in Vietnam.38  Revaluation would push even more in that 
direction. 
 
Suspicions of non-commercial motivations behind China’s OFDI are widespread because 
most of the country’s OFDI is by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, there is no 
systematic evidence that China’s SOEs, like their counterparts elsewhere, are driven by 
more than normal commercial considerations. At the same time, private or semi-private 
entities have been investing abroad. As their operations are less visible, it is likely that 
their OFDI, and therefore China’s total OFDI, is understated. 
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Fears of Chinese OFDI, as of Japanese and Korean investment in earlier decades, are 
misplaced. It is good for China and for host countries: Chinese FDI, like all FDI, can 
bring to host countries a bundle of tangible and intangible assets needed for economic 
growth and development. While a good part of China’s OFDI initially takes the form of 
trade-supporting FDI, it can be expected to lead relatively quickly to a shift of some 
production out of China, including to the US and Europe, thereby reducing exports from 
China. Moreover, OFDI is a key mechanism for integrating China into the world 
economy and making it a responsible stakeholder in it. 
 
However, Chinese firms will have to learn from the past mistakes of other emerging 
multinationals about how to operate in the highly sophisticated developed-country 
markets and in developing countries. They need not only to overcome the “liability of 
foreignness” that any multinational faces when establishing itself in a foreign market, but 
they also need to overcome the “liability of the home country.” In particular, they need to 
establish a good social brand name so that they are seen as making not only a positive 
economic contribution to their host countries, but are also seen as good corporate citizens. 
The Chinese government can play a crucial role by adopting a code of conduct for all 
Chinese enterprises investing abroad, in line with internationally accepted norms and 
taking into account the increasing importance of sustainable FDI. For their part, host 
countries need to accept the “new kids on the block” and not discriminate against Chinese 




Will China relocate its labor-intensive factories to Africa, flying-geese 
style? 
 
Terutomo Ozawa and Christian Bellak* 
   
China has developed increasingly close economic relations with Africa in its quest for oil 
and minerals through investment and aid. The World Bank recently called upon China to 
transplant labor-intensive factories onto the continent. A question arises as to whether 
such an industrial relocation will be done in such a fashion to jump-start local economic 
development – as previously seen across East Asia and as described in the flying-geese 
(FG) paradigm of FDI.39  
  
Many studies have examined China’s – and other countries’ – investments in Africa’s 
light industries (notably leather goods and textiles) and pointed out a host of difficulties 
they face because of poor local institutional conditions.40 Hence, this Chapter evaluates 
mostly China-side factors that may decisively induce a transmigration of labor-intensive 
factories, specifically to the sub-Saharan region. Judging from Asia’s FG model, three 
factors are the crucial inducements for FDI in low-end manufacturing: (1) labor costs; (2) 
exchange rates; and (3) institutions. 
 
Labor costs  
Successful catch-up growth necessarily leads to a rapid rise in wages, rendering labor-
intensive exports uncompetitive. But how fast wages rise depends on the size of rural 
labor reserves that need to be shifted to industry. In this respect, unlike Japan and the 
newly industrialized economies (NIEs) that had a relatively limited reserve of rural labor 
because of their small geographical size, China has a massive rural labor force yet to be 
tapped. 750 million people still live in China’s countryside with the average rural income 
only one third of its urban counterpart. Nevertheless, the recent labor unrest and the sharp 
wage hikes in the coastal provinces will prompt a shift of factory jobs elsewhere. Here, 
China’s present income-doubling plan (by 2020) for its rural regions will promote intra-
country industrial migration. Thus, China’s own vast interior seems more attractive as 
new production sites than any faraway countries.  
 
Exchange rates 
Currency appreciation in effect “taxes” exports but “subsidizes” outward FDI and 
imports.  Japan and the NIEs submitted to swift and sharp rises in their currencies as they 
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succeeded in catch-up growth. True, the yuan has considerably appreciated over recent 
years – but only slowly and not drastically enough to trigger a massive relocation of 
labor-intensive manufacturing overseas – largely because China is not quite ready to 
dismantle labor-intensive industries that still provide much-needed jobs at home. This 
gradual pace of appreciation gives exporters more time to raise productivity or to relocate 
inland, thereby allowing them to hang on a while.     
 
Institutions 
Institutional factors weigh on both sides. Infrastructural deficiencies (e.g., unreliable 
power and water supply, transportation, communication, poor governance, inhospitable 
regulatory environments, work ethic) in Africa are well known. This explains why 
foreign multinational enterprises in general, let alone China’s, have not yet seriously 
advanced into the continent in search of low-cost labor. The governments of the Asian 
NIEs quickly realized the potential of Japanese and Western FDI and thus were prepared 
to provide relevant infrastructure, particularly special economic zones (SEZs).   
  
Since 2006, as part of its strategy to assist sub-Saharan Africa in attracting 
manufacturing, China has been helping establish SEZs, a scheme modeled on its own 
SEZs. Currently, the Chinese SEZ in Zambia serves as a model for such zones in Africa. 
At the moment, nevertheless, there exists China’s tendency toward ethnicity-bound 
groupism, as evidenced in the employment of Chinese construction workers in large 
numbers for aid projects, the settlement of Chinese migrants and petty merchants/caterers 
in host countries and the one-sided presence of Chinese consortia for overseas 
investments without much participation of local and other countries’ MNEs. 
 
In contrast, Asia’s SEZs succeeded in hosting not only foreign MNEs but many local 
firms as well, and host governments took proactive measures to use their SEZs as a 
learning conduit for modern technology and advanced business practices, a situation not 
yet commonly observable in sub-Saharan Africa. Lest China-sponsored SEZs that are 
presently in the early stages of development turn into “industrial Chinese diasporas,” so 
to speak, they would need multi-national participation, especially by African 
manufacturers themselves. South African MNEs, in particular, ought to participate in 
such zones. Recently, the International Finance Corporation decided to fund US$ 10 
million as a joint financier of a commercial complex project (worth about US$ 33 
million) in Tanzania with a Chinese company and a local non-profit organization, inviting 
a third party to fund an additional US$ 6.5 million41 – an arrangement designed to 
encourage multi-national participation and adherence to internationally acceptable social 
and environmental standards. In addition, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD)-OECD Africa Investment Initiative aims to strengthen the capacity of African 
countries to design and implement reforms that improve their business climate and to 
unlock investment potential in the continent. Also, the U.S.’s African Growth and 
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All in all, even though China may be serious about relocating low-cost factories to sub-
Saharan Africa, there are hurdles to clear on both sides. In the near term, China still can 
relocate labor-intensive manufacturing inland or to its low-cost neighbors, and sub-
Saharan Africa itself is institutionally not quite ready to host labor-seeking FDI on a scale 









With some delay, the internationalization of business R&D is following the globalization 
of production. Starting on a small scale during the 1970s and 1980s, the emergence of 
globally distributed R&D networks of multinational enterprises accelerated rapidly in the 
1990s. The “globalization of innovation” was facilitated and driven by a complex set of 
factors, including changes in trade and investment governance, improved intellectual 
property rights through TRIPS, the growing ease and falling cost of communicating and 
traveling around the globe, and the concomitant vertical industry specialization and 
unbundling of value chains. The growing and sustained level of cross-border M&As was 
one major direct driver, often having the effect that merged firms inherited multiple R&D 
sites in a number of countries. 
 
Until the end of the 1990s, the geography of (business) innovation was largely congruent 
with the triad of developed world regions: North America, Europe and Japan. Developing 
countries played a subsidiary role, either primarily supplying talent (brain drain) or 
functioning as sector specialists in smaller newly industrializing economies such as 
Taiwan Province of China, Singapore and Israel. Then, around the turn of the century, 
two interrelated strategies led to the “iron cage of the triad” starting to open: a R&D FDI 
shift to the two main emerging economies of China and India, and the upward move of 
Indian and Chinese vendors and contract research organizations (CROs) from providing 
routine services to knowledge process and R&D offshoring (Bruche 2009).  
 
By around 2001, the number of MNE R&D centers had only gradually grown to under 
100 in each of the two countries from the days of Texas Instruments’ early engagement in 
India in the mid-1980s and Motorola's pioneering R&D investments in China in the early 
1990s. The subsequent upsurge in MNE R&D centers in China and India calls to mind a 
take-off situation. In a rather sudden shift, the number of MNE R&D centers in China 
rose more than tenfold to around 1,100 (representing 920 MNEs) by the end of 2008 and 
to 780 (670 MNEs) in India (Zinnov 2009). The internal MNE R&D offshoring growth 
took place in parallel to the learning processes of Indian and Chinese vendors and CROs, 
leading to a similar expansion of R&D offshore outsourcing. Most surveys point to a 
continuation of this trend as companies report plans to move future R&D expansion to 
these two countries.  
 
Why has there been such a sudden shift to China and India? There are a number of clearly 
discernible factors. Toward the end of the 1990s, China had established itself as a global 
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lead market and world manufacturing center in a number of high and medium tech 
industries. While this implied a growing need for local asset exploiting R&D, greater 
competitive intensity also required increasingly new product development for the local 
market. Compared to the primarily market and customer oriented R&D investments in 
China, the bulk of R&D offshoring to India is so far mainly asset seeking, designed to 
take advantage of India's large and growing low cost intellectual infrastructure. In India, 
especially U.S.-based MNEs profited even more than in China from the large diaspora of 
highly qualified non-resident Indians in leading positions, and from return migration. The 
Chinese Government's skilful carrot and stick policy (trading market access for 
technology) and India's longstanding knowledge export promotion via privately owned 
science and technology parks are other important determinants. A push factor came from 
skill shortages in computer science and engineering in the US, and to some extent in 
Europe and Japan as well.  
 
While after 2000 China and India have become the most favored R&D destinations of 
MNEs outside of the triad (with the exception of Israel which does however not offer a 
sizeable market), they are in competition with other emerging economies like Russia, 
eastern Europe or Brazil for R&D FDI and R&D outsourcing contracts. Although their 
combination of comparative advantages like market size, the large low cost talent pool, 
English communication skills (India), very large highly qualified diasporas and 
reasonably developed R&D ecosystems is a difficult match for competing emerging 
markets, escalating wage cost and attrition of qualified R&D personnel recently seemed 
to endanger this position. The financial crisis can in this context be seen as a windfall 
helping to constrain escalating costs and providing the time and space for a restructuring 
and further advancement of the talent pools in both countries.  
 
To put the MNE R&D shift to China and India into a broader perspective, some other 
circumstances need to be taken into account. First, the bulk of business R&D in large 
triad countries is still carried out in the home country, and R&D FDI flows still take place 
predominantly within the triad (Jaruzelski and Dehoff 2008). Moreover, the new MNE 
R&D investment and offshoring to China and India is limited in sectoral scope: by far the 
largest share is accounted for by information and communication technologies, in India 
focused on software and engineering R&D; the remainder is more or less covered by the 
health sector (pharma, biotech and various chemical, preclinical, and clinical services) 
and the automotive industry. Finally, most MNE R&D work is concentrated in only a few 
regional clusters: taken together, Beijing and Shanghai and Bangalore/Pune/National 
Capital Region represent 60-80 % of all MNE R&D work.  
 
Even if the argument for a new geography of innovation today may be questioned, one 
can still ask whether the dynamics of the R&D shift herald the start of fundamental 
medium-term changes. Despite the dearth of systematic research on this issue, there 
seems to be a general consensus that the dominant share of MNE R&D in China and 
India comprises routine activities adapting existing designs or processes, or providing 
modular contributions transformed into innovative products and processes in the triad's 
higher order R&D centers. However, scattered evidence points to fast learning and 
upgrading processes resulting in ever more centers and CROs taking on selective regional 
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or global roles as centers of excellence within MNEs global innovation networks. It is 
still an open question whether this will also lead to a shift in the geographic loci of the 
eventual innovation – as long as the knowledge generated is globally transferable and 
China and India lack important complementary assets for its independent application and 
integration in new products (as, for instance, in pharmaceuticals and automobiles), the 
innovation may still be realized in the MNE home countries. In this sense, the R&D shift 
may strengthen rather than weaken the triad countries' economic position, and especially 
that of the U.S. The argument that the catch-up of China and India can be accelerated by 
spillover effects of local MNE R&D to Chinese and Indian companies and institutions 
may have some validity. So far, however, the R&D investment levels even in more 
advanced Chinese and Indian companies are low and local challengers may even suffer 
from an in-situ brain drain to MNEs able to offer more stimulating and rewarding work to 
talented R&D professionals. On the other hand, emerging country MNEs such as Huawei 
from China or Tata from India have started to acquire or establish R&D centers in the 
U.S. and Europe as a way to tap into advanced knowledge and technology clusters. 
 
It remains to be seen how far the financial crisis will trigger changes in the ongoing R&D 
relocation plans of MNEs. MNEs under pressure may have to cut R&D spending to 
maintain core operations in their home countries. Strong companies that closely track 
their innovation drive, such as, for example, Bosch or Siemens in Germany, or Cisco and 
Microsoft in the US, as well as companies in less affected industries like pharmaceuticals, 
may seize the chance to further enhance R&D efficiency and profit from a relaxation in 
the talent markets in China and India. They may also prepare for even stronger positions 
after the crisis when China and India may still be the fastest growing markets in the world 
economy. While the Chinese and Indian Governments will certainly welcome the 
emergence of a new geography of innovation the current global crisis may trigger a 
renewal of a more "techno-nationalist" stance among policy makers in the U.S. and 
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The global financial crisis: will state emergency measures trigger 
international investment disputes? 
 
Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kurtz* 
 
Several developed countries have introduced emergency measures to mitigate the effects 
of the global financial crisis, including Australia, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. Although the measures taken are still undergoing changes by the 
executive branch and are thus a “moving target”, our survey reveals early evidence of 
differentiation between foreign and domestic actors in the emergency plans adopted by 
this sample grouping. It is this differentiation that may give rise to liability as breaching 
guarantees against discrimination of foreign investors under international investment law.  
  
In general, the emergency measures passed to date can be grouped into three broad 
categories: (1) measures designed to bolster the stability of the financial services 
industry; (2) measures directed at the financial services industry but structured to increase 
the availability of credit to other sectors of the economy; and (3) general fiscal measures 
designed to boost public spending and targeting select and strategic industries (including 
the automotive industry). Our focus is on the first and second categories, which we regard 
as presently most likely to engage international investment law. 
 
The emergency measures 
The extensive measures undertaken in this first category are designed to increase the 
confidence of market participants and to ensure the continuation of bank funding. They 
encompass liquidity support, recapitalization (through share purchases or otherwise), 
purchase of specific assets (including “toxic” bank assets), inter-bank (wholesale) lending 
guarantees and increases in retail deposit guarantees.  
  
Australia and Ireland have introduced new insurance schemes for retail deposits, 
wholesale lending, and, in Ireland’s case, guarantees for covered bonds, senior and dated 
subordinated debt. Both measures triggered flight of wholesale capital from excluded 
foreign bank branches to domestic guaranteed institutions. Those countries are not alone 
in building adverse incentives for regulatory arbitrage. The financial stabilization 
programs in Germany and the United Kingdom cover only financial institutions with their 
seat in the respective country and also exclude branches of foreign institutions (as 
authorized deposit takers). In contrast, Switzerland has elected to bail out specific 
institutions taken to be of systemic importance. To date, the benefits of this program have 
only been extended to one Swiss bank – UBS – with a promise to do the same for 
another, Credit Suisse. The U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act authorizes 
                                                 
*
 The authors wish to thank Jose Alvarez, James Mendenhall, Christoph Schreuer and Karl P. Sauvant for 
their helpful comments on this chapter. It was first published as a Perspective on March 23, 2009.  
50 
purchase of distressed assets (especially mortgage-backed securities) in financial 
institutions if they have “significant operations” in the United States. Early reports 
suggest that domestic U.S. institutions are the majority if not exclusive recipients of 
capital injections under the scheme. If this trend continues, there may be differentiation 
against foreign institutions as a matter of fact, even if not on the face of the law. The 
second category of emergency measures also targets the finance sector but is designed to 
directly foster the provision of credit throughout the economy. Both the United Kingdom 
and Germany have structured their plans so that participants must support lending to 
credit worthy borrowers – mainly small to medium sized enterprises – as a condition of 
the receipt of governmental support. Much again will depend on how this aspect of the 
scheme is implemented in practice. If this condition leads to the provision of credit solely 
to national industry, this too will evidence differentiation against foreign actors as a 
matter of fact, even if not on the face of the law.  
 
Implications under international investment law 
There are approximately 2800 bilateral and regional investment treaties (including 
investment chapters in free trade agreements) in operation across the globe. Except for 
Ireland, the countries we have surveyed have all entered into multiple investment treaty 
commitments. Most of the newer investment treaties of the sample grouping have been 
signed with developing countries and Eastern European states. On first view, this might 
preclude claims by foreign investors of OECD countries against other OECD countries 
since there are almost no investment treaties in operation among them, although they are 
both the source and the target of the major financial transactions. However, treaty 
shopping might enable investors to make use of an investment treaty by channeling their 
investment through any other country that has concluded a BIT with an OECD country.  
Furthermore, older investment commitments – including Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation treaties – remain in operation across a range of OECD countries (including a 
number of countries we have surveyed). These treaties usually allow disputes to be 
brought before the International Court of Justice and, at least in the case of the U.S., may 
be self-executing as a matter of U.S. constitutional law giving investors of a state-party 
the ability to initiate claims before U.S. courts.42  
  
Newer investment treaties normally confer direct rights of international dispute 
settlement on foreign investors of a signatory state. The ability to do so will depend 
initially on whether the measures in question fall within the scope of a given treaty 
instrument. Investment treaties commonly structure their operations on an expansive 
“negative list” system (whereby all government measures including those relating to the 
finance sector are covered unless specifically exempted). This is in contrast to more 
conservative scheduling systems such as the “positive list” method of the WTO General 
Agreement on Trade in Services. 
  
If action is brought, there is a possibility that the measures we have surveyed may attract 
liability under investment treaty commitments or in certain national courts. In particular, 
we see a case for breach of the obligation to accord national treatment. These measures 
may also breach the “fair and equitable” standard, most notably its limitation on 
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discriminatory conduct on the part of a signatory state. There is, however, considerable 
uncertainty both in arbitral jurisprudence and among commentators on the precise outer 
contours of the “fair and equitable” guarantee. With that in mind, we focus our analysis 
on national treatment. 
  
National treatment proscribes “less favorable treatment” of a foreign investor that stands 
“in like circumstances” or “like situations” with a domestic actor. The fact that a measure 
is temporary and triggers loss but is then removed (as in Australia) does not excuse legal 
liability, per se. Moreover, the obligation to accord national treatment will cover 
instances of both de jure (in law) and de facto (in fact) discrimination. The latter covers 
measures that may not explicitly distinguish on nationality but pose a greater adverse 
burden on foreign actors in the host state. The non-binding OECD National Treatment 
Instrument is a relevant source for guidance on the constituent elements of the national 
treatment obligation. Investor-state arbitral tribunals have drawn on the OECD National 
Treatment Instrument in looking to competitive interactions as a necessary condition of 
finding that domestic and foreign investors operate “in like circumstances”. They have 
also, on occasion, interpreted these parameters rather broadly, which might see the whole 
financial sector (rather than a specific industry grouping) as the basis for comparison 
between foreign and domestic actors. Ultimately however, the question of breach will 
come down to whether a tribunal requires evidence of some malign governmental 
purpose, particularly on claims of de facto discrimination. Certain cases have explored – 
with different emphases – whether the distinction is based on legitimate policy grounds 
and justifiable or solely as a means of conferring protection to domestic actors and thus 
impermissible. Much will depend here on the indicia employed by a tribunal in a test for 
protectionist purpose. Even on a test requiring evidence of constructed purpose, some of 
these measures may not withstand scrutiny. Indeed, similar forms of discrimination to 
those we have surveyed were employed by the Czech Republic – in response to a 
domestic financial crisis in the late 1990s – and were ruled to be in breach its investment 
treaty obligations.43  
  
There are exceptions for host country conduct in the event of a finding of liability for 
breach of national treatment. Some investment treaties include qualified exemption for 
prudential measures in the finance sector (modeled on the GATS). But one should keep in 
mind that the most-favored nation clause in those treaties may afford claimants better 
treatment if their host country has concluded other treaties without those carve-outs. 
Older investment treaties typically only exempt measures necessary to maintain “public 
order” or protect “essential security interests”. While newer iterations of these exceptions 
are self-judging, most of the older formulations clearly contemplate a role for an 
adjudicator in the application of the exception. Indeed, the scope of this vague exemption 
was assessed in a range of cases brought against Argentina in the aftermath of its 2001-
2002 financial crisis. In those cases, particular tribunals were prepared to find that the 
adverse societal effects of financial crisis might engage a country’s “essential security 
interests”. On the whole though, it is unlikely that the current measures will fall within 
the exemption. In particular, it will be difficult to make the argument that discrimination 
directed against foreign bank institutions (with domestic depositors) was indeed 
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“necessary” to protect those “essential security interests”. Argentina has also been unable 
to escape its treaty obligations by invoking the customary plea of a state of necessity. We 
therefore expect similar legal treatment of the current measures. 
 
Conclusion 
We draw two tentative conclusions, implicated in our analysis of potential liability under 
international investment treaties. First, there is clear evidence of widespread 
discrimination directed at foreign actors in the laws we have surveyed despite the public 
commitment of state parties to free market principles, including the rule of law, respect 
for private property, open trade and investment and competitive markets, expressed at the 
G-20 meetings. This is not confined to any individual state or select grouping; it is a 
marked characteristic of emergency responses to the financial crisis across a significant 
proportion of the globe. This then is a timely reminder to revisit the lessons associated 
with the outbreak of protectionism leading to the Great Depression in the inter-war 
period. Protectionism is the result of a prisoner’s dilemma understood in game theory 
terms. Cooperation would make every country better off, but it is individually rational for 
countries to pursue their self-interest (and protect domestic industry) at least in the short 
term. While protectionist instincts are now more nuanced, it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that countries are failing to cooperate in the current crisis, with possible 
cascading consequences.  
  
This leads to our second, tentative concern, namely whether international law will fulfill a 
key function in the contemporary period. The framers of the post-Second World War 
architecture of international economic law were deeply influenced by the lessons of the 
inter-war period. They had drafted rules hoping to embed a loose form of cooperation and 
constrain the freedom of countries to resort to short-term protectionist measures. The 
preparedness and rapidity by which countries are now moving in that direction raise 
serious questions of whether our existing system is a sufficient check against these 
problematic tendencies.  
  
Ultimately, these sensitive issues may be addressed – in less than optimal ways – in legal 
rather than diplomatic fora. The 2001 Argentine financial crisis triggered a wave of 
international litigation against that state. If current trends continue, there is no reason to 





The response to the global crisis and investment protection: evidence 
 
Kathryn Gordon and Joachim Pohl* 
 
The chapter above, first published in March 2009, carried an early analysis of investment 
policies in response to the financial crisis that began in early 2008.44 At that time, the 
authors, Anne van Aaken and Jürgen Kuntz, found “clear evidence of widespread 
discrimination directed at foreign actors” in the emergency response to the crisis.  
 
One year on, OECD analysis suggests a more nuanced assessment of investment policy 
making during the crisis. The findings of a series of OECD reports tracking investment 
policy trends in 49 developed and emerging markets since November 2008 challenge the 
wholesale claim that investment policy measures taken during the crisis were driven by a 
protectionist agenda involving significant discrimination against foreign investors.45 
However, in the current context, the OECD inventory of investment measures also shows 
that crisis response and exit policies (that is, policies that unwind crisis response 
measures) pose a major threat to the openness of international investment. 
 
Fears of a destructive spiral of investment protection and retaliation have not materialized  
As the crisis deepened in 2008, fears took hold of a destructive cycle of protectionist and 
retaliatory policies of the type experienced in earlier deep crises.46 In retrospect, these 
fears proved largely unfounded. General investment measures – those not covered by 
national security or crisis exceptions – taken since the outbreak of the global crisis point, 
with few exceptions, toward greater openness and transparency for foreign investors. 
Governments have streamlined investment review procedures, loosened limits on foreign 
ownership in domestic companies and abolished monopolies that had previously limited 
foreign investments. The OECD found several dozen general investment measures, of 
which only a few restrict inward or outward investment. 
 
Crisis measures have pervasive impacts on inward and outward capital flows  
While general investment policy changes tended to promote international investment, the 
many crisis response measures that governments introduced to rescue or support 
companies bear significant potential for discrimination against foreign investors. Except 
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for a few emerging markets, almost all countries in the OECD inventory established such 
schemes since late 2008, and new measures were still being introduced in early 2010. A 
conservative OECD estimate found that, by September 2009, G-20 governments alone 
had made combined public expenditure commitments of more than US$ 3 trillion to assist 
companies in difficulty – roughly US$ 10 billion per day on average since the dramatic 
deepening of the crisis in autumn 2008. By early 2010, several thousand companies had 
received financial support or were expected to benefit from support schemes. The 
massive support measures influence worldwide capital flows in various ways: by 
affecting the pattern of entry and exit in globalized sectors such as finance and 
automobiles or via direct governmental participation in firms’ investment decisions by 
virtue of control rights conferred by shareholdings acquired as part of crisis response 
policies.  
 
Emergency measures pose a serious threat to open investment  
While emergency measures have almost certainly influenced international capital flows, 
their discriminatory or protectionist intent or effect is less certain. Indeed, the design and 
implementation of emergency measures varies significantly among countries. In addition, 
the determination of what is non-discriminatory treatment can be a subtle one, especially 
in the financial sector. Under OECD investment dialogue, policies such as "fit" and 
"proper" tests of general application, financial requirements for non-residents’ branches 
equivalent to levels applied to domestic entities, rules for consolidated supervision and 
the non-extension of emergency lending facilities to non-residents' branches are not 
necessarily considered discriminatory. Under this approach,47 the OECD inventory finds 
that most crisis response schemes are designed to be non-discriminatory (i.e., they are de 
jure designed to be open to participation by foreign-controlled companies).  
 
However, even those support schemes that are de jure open to foreign controlled 
enterprises may be administered in a discriminatory manner. Crisis response poses a 
dilemma for policy makers – they need to take action, but most options for crisis response 
pose grave risks for public sector transparency and market competition. The 
implementation of most schemes involved significant discretion for the implementing 
authorities; many governments participated directly in one-on-one negotiations with 
companies on conditions for rescue or mergers – over 100 business-government 
negotiations are recorded in the OECD inventory. While confidential, one-on-one 
negotiations may have helped protect companies involved in rescue negotiations, they are 
also inherently non-transparent and may cover discrimination and complicate public 
scrutiny of such measures.  
 
The risk of discrimination has not abated – "exit" is the next challenge 
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The “exit” phase of crisis response involves the dismantling of policies and the 
unwinding of stakes in companies acquired in the course of crisis management. The 
OECD inventory shows that the introduction of new crisis response schemes has 
significantly slowed, and exit from emergency measures, especially in the financial 
sector, has begun in some countries. However, the risks of discriminatory treatment of 
foreign controlled enterprises have not declined. 
 
Ongoing implementation of rescue and support schemes perpetuates the abovementioned 
risks, albeit arguably at a smaller scale as rescue operations of most large companies are 
concluded. New risks arise in the exit phase that is only just beginning: governments that 
have acquired financial positions will decide on the timing and modalities of divestments 
and will have to select from among the potential acquirers of the assets. The risks from 
governments’ discretion in administering the exit process raise concerns similar to those 
of the rescues of large financial institutions in the early stages of the crisis. Furthermore, 
until the public financial positions in companies are unwound, governments will also 
need to manage tensions between their roles as owners of companies and their roles in 




Are sovereign wealth funds welcome now? 
 
Veljko Fotak and William Megginson* 
 
Until the end of 2007, western media, governments and regulators often seemed more 
concerned about protecting domestic firms from investments by sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs) than about attracting capital inflows. Politicians in many countries called for the 
regulation of sovereign foreign investments at that time, when SWF investments were 
growing rapidly. In fact, during 2006 and 2007, countries that introduced at least one 
regulatory change (many of them related to such investments) making the investment 
climate less welcoming for multinational enterprises accounted for 40% of all FDI 
inflows.48  
 
In early 2008, attitudes began to change, as SWFs temporarily rescued the western 
banking system by purchasing approximately US$ 60 billion of new equity issued by 
U.S. and European banks. As the financial crisis deepened, western financial firms 
displayed an ever-increasing appetite for foreign capital. At the same time, sources of the 
latter dried up rapidly, with a decrease in total FDI in 2008 of around 15%. Investment in 
OECD countries by SWFs declined throughout 2008, totaling US$ 37 billion during the 
first quarter, US$ 9 billion during the second and US$ 8 billion during the third.49 A 
handful of factors brought about this decline. Low commodity prices and the 
underperformance of previous investments led to a shrinking asset and funding base even 
as a renewed emphasis on more conservative asset classes and domestic investments 
dramatically reduced the proportion of assets invested in foreign equity.  
 
The ongoing need for capital by the western financial system, coupled with the sudden 
drop in foreign investments by SWFs, is leading to a dramatic shift in attitudes. Rather 
than discouraging SWF capital inflows, Western governments and firms are actively 
seeking sovereign direct investment, and public calls for opening financial markets to 
SWFs now abound.50 Whereas observers once feared an excessive push toward the 
regulation of foreign investment and a consequent stifling of FDI inflows into OECD 
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countries, these fears have been allayed in part by the adoption of the Santiago Principles 
by both the major SWFs and the principal Western countries that now seek SWF capital.  
 
Today, we are again facing the risk of overreaction, but in the opposite direction: security 
concerns, certainly overplayed in the past, are being sidelined. Yet, previous calls for 
protectionism and current appeals to open markets completely both lack the support of 
empirical evidence, as very little is known about the impact of SWF investments on target 
firms and recipient economies. Accordingly, we believe that the most important step for 
governments is to promote the analysis of SWF investments and their impact on target 
firms, with the goal of developing the body of knowledge necessary for the formulation 
of the proper regulatory response. In doing so, we recommend the following guiding 
principles: 
 
• The burden of proof should fall on those calling for restricting access to national 
markets. While we recognize the need for further investigation, we note that, 
despite over a half-century of SWF activity, there are no examples of politically 
charged or otherwise detrimental (to recipient economies) SWF investments. At 
the same time, the benefits associated with long-term, stable investments are 
obvious. 
• Beware of excessive transparency. Regulators have singled out SWFs for their 
lack of transparency. Yet, many other investment vehicles, such as hedge funds, 
are just as opaque. While transparency is, in general terms, desirable, transparency 
imposed on select market participants can put those at a serious disadvantage and 
lead to unprofitable trading; in fact, evidence indicates that SWF profitability is 
inversely related to their transparency.51 Any measure aimed at increasing 
transparency should not be targeted at any specific class of investors. SWFs need 
to provide information to regulators, but should not be subject to any further 
transparency requirements in respect to other market participants.  
• Act multilaterally – involve the World Trade Organization along with the IMF. 
Past experience with FDI regulation suggests that multilateral action is more 
effective than bilateral agreements. Accordingly, we urge regulators to act in 
concert. The IMF brokered the Santiago Principles last year, and should remain 
involved in negotiations between SWFs and investee countries. Another 
international body that naturally emerges as a candidate for assuming a true 
regulatory role is the WTO, as it already enforces the General Agreement on 
Trades in Services which covers most SWF investments. 
• Remember that SWFs are not all equal. Governments must realize that SWFs are 
a heterogeneous group. They vary dramatically in respect to size, funding, 
objectives, investment style and sophistication. Accordingly, regulators should 
resist the temptation to restrict SWFs unduly in the event of a fund 
“misbehaving.” Regulation should, a priori, treat all SWFs equally, but any ad-
hoc response should affect the offending fund, rather than the entire category.  
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Formulating the proper regulatory response requires striking a fine balance between the 
need for foreign capital and the danger of foreign governments interfering in sensitive 
sectors of the economy. Yet, while the benefits are clear, the risks are not yet understood. 
Unfortunately, a global financial crisis and recession is not the best time for the 
development of a cool-headed, rational, regulatory response, but the actions of western 
governments during this period are likely to shape the landscape of FDI for years to 
come. In the short term, we urge regulators to rely on existing FDI restrictions, already 
ensuring the avoidance of the most pernicious scenarios, and on SWF self-regulation, 











The first sovereign wealth fund was established by Kuwait in 1953,52 and was followed 
by many others from 1973-1974, after the first oil crisis.53 Since then, each major jump in 
oil and gas prices increased the number and size of SWFs; after 2000, countries with 
large trade surpluses also began to establish SWFs. By April 2009, SWFs had grown to 
US$ 3-5 trillion of assets under management,54 invested mostly in high quality bonds. 
Equity investments have been a much smaller part of their portfolio and began to grow 
only in the 1990s. This trend has since accelerated with at least 698 documented equity 
investments between June 2005 and March 2009.55 
 
These investments brought SWFs not only increased attention, but also their name, 
adopted by the Financial Times in May 2007.56 This has been unfortunate and 
misleading. The term has endowed SWFs with a special and even threatening aura, even 
though, under international law, they do not enjoy sovereign immunity, as they are just 
state-owned entities, along with government-owned airlines, banks, shipping companies, 
etc. We have a long history of national and international jurisprudence for dealing with 
these, but, since reality is rarely a bar to fashion, the term is here to stay. 
 
The recent large investments by SWFs in troubled financial institutions brought these 
funds unprecedented publicity, and the increased attention of the governments of host 
countries and of International Financial Institutions. The former were interested mainly in 
the economic and security implications of SWFs’ investments, while the latter, and the 
OECD in particular, seem concerned that SWFs might face restrictions by host countries 
of the kind that many of the SWFs’ home countries have been applying against foreign 
investors.57 
                                                 
*
 The author is writing in his personal capacity and wishes to thank Rudi Bogni, Mary Bonar, Veljko Fotak, 
Nanette Neuwahl, and Stephen Y. K. Pan for their helpful comments. This chapter was first published as a 
Perspective on October 1, 2009.  
52
 Bernardo Bortoletti, Veljko Fotak, William L. Meggison, William F. Miracky, “Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investment Patterns and Performance,” MSS Draft, 13 July 2009, pp. 39 and 49. (Hereafter: BFMM). 
53
 Singapore was the exception to this rule; it established in Temasek Holdings in 1974, and the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation in 1981. 
54
 BFMM, op. cit., p. 37, listing 32 funds that meet Monitor-FEEM standards, with US$ 1,831 million in 
assets, while UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2008: Transnational Corporations and the 
Infrastructure Challenge (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2008), p. 20 reported US$ 5 billion as a headline number, 
but also noted US$ 3 billion+ as a credible estimate. 
55
 BFMM, op. cit., p. 1. 
56
 BFMM, op. cit., p. 50. 
57
 See e.g., OECD, “Sovereign wealth funds and recipient country policies: report by the OECD Investment 
Committee,” (Paris: Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008). 
60 
 
How important in fact are the SWFs? Of course, 3-5 trillion dollars is a lot of money, but 
it is only a small part of the investment universe. This universe includes external 
sovereign debt of US$ 55 trillion, equities of at least US$ 40 trillion, plus even more in 
real estate, artificial financial instruments, precious metals, commodity trading 
instruments, and so on and on. SWFs are actually one of the smaller players, just above 
hedge funds. By way of comparison, pension funds, mutual funds and insurance funds 
each have approximately US$ 20-23 trillion of assets.  
 
Paradoxically, SWFs are least important with regards to foreign direct investment, 
defined by the IMF as equity investments that exceed 10% of the target company’s voting 
shares. Annual FDI flows in the past 10 years have ranged between US$ 600 billion to a 
record US$ 2 trillion in 2007. Meanwhile, the FDI from SWFs amounted to only US$ 10 
billion in 2007: 0.2% of their total assets, and 0.6% of the FDI flows that year.58 
 
Clearly, the attention and concern generated by SWFs has been disproportionate to their 
systemic importance, and especially so regarding FDI. The reasons? SWFs are good copy 
for the media because most are from distant countries with dictatorial or authoritarian 
regimes, they are at least vaguely mysterious, and many of their transactions are 
genuinely newsworthy. The media’s focus has in turn generated hype and political 
attention, and much of what we are witnessing now is similar to the spectacles of the late 
1970s about Arab equity investments in the United States and Western Europe. 
 
The attention by governments has been partly a response to public and political pressures, 
but their concern about national security should not be underestimated. All foreign 
investment has been subject to national security considerations for a long time. SWFs are 
instruments of state, mostly of states with at best delicate relations with NATO member 
countries, and several belong to potential adversaries with a long history of extensive and 
effective espionage. SWFs are not the best vehicle for information gathering, influencing 
host countries, and for various economic and commercial mischiefs, and this is why 
national security related reviews cover all foreign investments. 
 
In the coming years, SWFs will grow in number and size, probably in an international 
arena more turbulent than now, and SWFs will continue to favor the major advanced 
economies. Although SWFs are unlikely to become a significant source of FDI, their 
importance in other equity investments may well increase along the lines of their recent 
acquisitions of up to 9.99% of several major financial institutions. Consequently, host 
governments will continue to be obliged to follow a fine line between the demands of 
national security, balanced against the desirability of increased capital inflows, and the 
goodwill of countries needed for the attainment of foreign policy objectives. 
 
This may well require a review process for SWFs that goes beyond the existing review 
mechanisms, and may even have informal aspects. Host countries will need to 
differentiate SWFs by their nationality and by their relationship with the host countries. 
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Therefore, decision-making will need the direct involvement of the diplomatic, military 
and intelligence communities while still acting within the time frame required by 
investors. All this may seem daunting, but the United States and the United Kingdom in 
particular have immense experience in dealing with foreign investment since the First 
World War. These experiences and modus operandi are readily transferable to existing or 
new monitoring entities. It remains to be seen whether SWFs will become a source of 
conflict or of responsible capital, but judging from past experience, a sensible and 
sensitive review process should serve well both the SWFs and the host countries as long 
as they are both aiming at a seamless and quiet settlement of actual and potential 
disagreements. After all, business is business, and host countries and SWFs have already 




The revised national security review process for FDI in the United 
States 
 
Mark E. Plotkin and David N. Fagan* 
 
On December 22, 2008, new regulations setting forth the U.S. government’s national 
security review process for foreign mergers and acquisitions of U.S. businesses became 
effective. They are the ultimate step in a lengthy effort to revise and strengthen the 
reviews undertaken by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
(CFIUS).59  
 
CFIUS administers the so-called Exon-Florio statute, which provides the U.S. President 
with the authority to review mergers, acquisitions and takeovers that may result in foreign 
control over a U.S. person or entity engaged in interstate commerce in the United States. 
(Greenfield investments are not subject to CFIUS review.) For M&As that threaten to 
impair U.S. national security in a manner that cannot be mitigated or that is not, in the 
President’s judgment, otherwise addressable through other U.S. laws, the President can 
suspend or prohibit such foreign investments – a decision not subject to any judicial 
review. The Exon-Florio statute itself, and CFIUS as the statute’s administering body, 
came under political attack in the wake of the 2006 Dubai Ports World debacle. Some in 
the U.S. Congress sought to tighten drastically the legal regime for foreign investment in 
the United States. Fortunately, through the leadership of certain key members of 
Congress, the administration and the business community, the debate shifted to 
improving the review process in a manner that protects national security while preserving 
the openness of the U.S. to foreign investment. The end result was the Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act of 2007, which thoughtfully enhanced Exon-Florio 
and the CFIUS process. The Treasury Department, working with the other CFIUS 
agencies, has now issued final regulations implementing the Act. 
 
The amended CFIUS process maintains the formal existing timeframes for reviewing 
M&As, providing a critical measure of certainty to foreign investors and U.S. parties. The 
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timeframe for CFIUS review – and Presidential action, when necessary – can be 
summarized as follows: 
• CFIUS conducts an initial 30-day review following receipt of a voluntary notice 
filed jointly by the foreign acquirer and the U.S. business. The vast majority of 
CFIUS cases are concluded following this initial 30-day review. 
• For transactions deemed to require additional review following the initial 30 days, 
the statute authorizes CFIUS to conduct an investigation for up to an additional 45 
days. 
• If CFIUS has not unanimously resolved a threat to U.S. national security at the end 
of the 45-day investigation period, CFIUS will provide a formal report to the 
President. The President then has 15 days to issue his decision in the case. (Few 
transactions reach the stage of requiring a Presidential decision.)  
• CFIUS is now required to report to Congress on its reviews, but those reports occur 
only after the review is concluded. There is no formal prior role for Congress. 
For foreign investors and U.S. parties, there are a number of other notable aspects of 
CFIUS’s authority and jurisdiction under the amended law and regulations. First, the 
CFIUS regime continues to employ a broadly flexible definition of “control” by a foreign 
person for purposes of determining CFIUS jurisdiction. Second, the applicable law and 
regulations do not precisely define the meaning of “national security.” CFIUS’s national 
security assessment in turn remains a case-by-case determination. Even the presence of 
foreign government-control over the investor – for which there is a statutory presumption 
of heightened scrutiny – does not necessarily create a national security risk; CFIUS still 
considers all facts and circumstances related to the particular M&A at issue in 
determining what, if any, national security risk is presented. Third, while CFIUS has 
authority to initiate its own reviews of M&As, the CFIUS review remains an inherently 
voluntary process, affording parties with discretion on when and whether to notify CFIUS 
of a “covered transaction” (i.e., a M&A involving investment by a foreign person). 
Fourth, while CFIUS’s amended legal authorities provide, in practice, for a more 
deliberative process that can result in enhanced scrutiny in certain cases and, in turn, a 
greater number investigations, they also create an arguably higher bar for CFIUS to 
extract formal (and potentially costly) risk-mitigation commitments from M&A parties as 
a condition of approval. 
Together, these characteristics of the amended CFIUS regime offer CFIUS the latitude to 
review transactions likely to raise real (or perceived) national security risks and to 
address those risks reasonably, without trampling the overall U.S. policy of promoting 
foreign investment. They also offer transactional parties discretion on whether to 
condition the consummation of covered M&As upon CFIUS approval. Consequently, 
while the number of M&As filed with CFIUS has been rising steadily in recent years (see 
the table below), CFIUS likely will continue to review just a fraction – generally 
estimated to be less than 10% – of foreign investments in U.S. businesses. Furthermore, 
even with the enhanced number of filings and increased investigations, the vast majority 
of CFIUS’s reviews will continue to conclude in the initial 30-day time period.  
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It is important to note, however, that M&A parties should tread carefully with their 
discretion on when and whether to notify CFIUS of a transaction and to require CFIUS 
approval before closing the transaction. CFIUS does monitor M&A activity, and it is 
always preferable for parties to raise a transaction with CFIUS voluntarily rather than to 
have CFIUS formally come calling after the transaction is announced. Moreover, while 
relatively few covered M&As raise potential national security concerns, the President and 
CFIUS have the power to unwind a transaction after closing. Conversely, a CFIUS 
review and approval provides a form of safe harbor for a transaction that can only be 
revisited in very limited, exceptional circumstances. Given this dynamic, parties are well 
advised to assess the CFIUS-related ramifications of a potential transaction involving 
foreign investment – and to determine whether a CFIUS review is advisable – in advance 
of entering into a covered M&A.  
 
Table 1. CFIUS Filings and Investigations, 2001-2008 




























Source: U.S. Treasury Department. 
 
In the end, the revised CFIUS regime largely preserves existing practices and timeframes; 
provides somewhat greater clarity to transaction parties; establishes greater accountability 
within the CFIUS process and of CFIUS to the U.S. Congress; and strengthens political 
confidence in, and respect for, the CFIUS review system. Given the difficult place where 
the political process commenced after Dubai Ports World, this is a positive result, and 
benefits foreign investors and U.S. parties alike by assuring greater transparency and 




Foreign direct investment and U.S. national security: CFIUS under 
the Obama administration 
 
Mark E. Plotkin and David N. Fagan* 
    
There was considerable public scrutiny of the Obama administration’s performance in its 
inaugural year, but comparatively little focus on one of the administration’s key 
processes governing the flow of investment into the United States – namely, the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Yet, this is a frequent 
question we receive from foreign investors – has the change in the administration 
affected CFIUS?  
  
The good news for investors and U.S. transaction parties alike is that the overall CFIUS 
process continues to function well under the Obama administration and has been faithful 
to the principles of open investment. At the same time, there have been several notable 
developments in the volume and pace of CFIUS reviews over the past year that should be 
of interest to those who watch the cross-border M&A market closely.  
  
The slowdown in overall M&A activity contributed to a reduction in filings with 
CFIUS.60 In 2008, CFIUS reviewed 155 cases; CFIUS reviewed fewer than half as many 
transactions in 2009.61 This is the lowest number of notices since 2005 and the first 
reversal of an upward trend in nearly a decade.  
 
Perhaps the most significant development for investors was that CFIUS’s pace for 
completing its reviews also slowed materially in 2009. While official figures have not 
been released, CFIUS escalated a much higher percentage of matters under review to a 
second-stage 45-day “investigation” to the point that, by percentage, investigation nearly 
became the rule rather than the exception in 2009. By contrast, through 2007, fewer than 
two percent of all cases reviewed by CFIUS had proceeded to the investigation phase 
and, in 2008 (a year in which CFIUS received the most filings in nearly two decades), the 
number of investigations still was fewer than 15% of all cases.  
  
The slower pace of CFIUS reviews and corresponding increase in investigations may be 
attributed to several factors. First, there was a natural bureaucratic lag that results from 
any change in administration and turnover in senior positions in key agencies. The 
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Treasury Department and other CFIUS agencies worked valiantly to move CFIUS cases 
along for review but often the necessary policy-level approvals were slow in coming. 
  
Second, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), which 
“reformed” CFIUS and codified its review authority, established a presumption of 
investigation for foreign government transactions and transactions involving critical 
infrastructure. The number of investigations in 2009 partially reflects the continued role 
of state-owned enterprises and other sovereign investors even in the slower 2009 M&A 
market.  
  
Third, and most important, the Executive Order (EO) adopted by the Bush administration 
to implement FINSA included several provisions aimed at tightening CFIUS’s internal 
administration. In particular, the EO established a more rigorous internal process that 
CFIUS must undertake before it proposes measures directed at “risk mitigation” for a 
particular transaction. This internal process, while more disciplined and focused strictly 
on addressing only true national security issues, also creates an additional layer to the 
regulatory approval process. The result has been fewer mitigation agreements but a 
corresponding time lag due to the heightened formality of the internal mitigation process. 
  
This trade-off between fewer mitigations agreements but longer CFIUS reviews has 
benefits and costs for transaction parties. Investors benefit as the trend reduces longer-
term compliance costs associated with CFIUS approvals. On the other hand, delays in the 
average time for key regulatory approvals can potentially have a negative market impact, 
making foreign investors less attractive – and, therefore, requiring higher prices from 
them – than potential U.S. acquirers.  
  
To be sure, there are reasons for optimism that equilibrium between mitigation and 
timing will be reached. Most key political positions with responsibility for CFIUS have 
been filled (after slow nomination and confirmation processes). As these officials become 
more comfortable with the inter-agency process, the processes established under FINSA 
become more routine, and the internal precedent under FINSA grows, the machinery of 
CFIUS will hopefully pick up pace and restore a balance between expeditious reviews 
and careful mitigation.  
  
There also are measured steps that transaction parties can take to facilitate the review 
process. CFIUS encourages transactions parties to engage with CFIUS before filing. 
More consequential, transaction parties can anticipate and address ancillary regulatory 
issues – such as necessary export control-related filings or compliance matters – that 
involve member agencies of CFIUS to keep those issues distinct from the CFIUS process. 
The failure to anticipate such issues can lead to their introduction into CFIUS’s 
deliberations, delaying CFIUS approval until they can be separately sorted with the 
particular member agency. 
  
Notwithstanding this dynamic nature of CFIUS’s considerations and the concerns over 
the timing delays over the past year, CFIUS in many ways remains a model for 
preserving open investment while balancing national security considerations. Placing the 
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process in some perspective, it is remarkable that a government regulatory review that 
requires not just coordination but consensus from roughly a dozen federal agencies, each 
of which has its own perspective and equities – and each of which may itself require 
coordination among many internal offices and components – can be completed in the vast 
majority of cases within the statutory timeframes (either 30 or 75 days) and with little 





National security with a Canadian twist: the Investment Canada Act 




On March 12, 2009, the Canadian federal government passed significant amendments to 
the Investment Canada Act (ICA), Canada’s foreign investment law of general 
application.62 Though the amendments generally liberalize important aspects of the 
Canadian foreign investment review regime, they also include a broadly worded national 
security test that now allows the responsible minister to review proposed investments in 
Canada on national security grounds.63 On July 11, 2009, the government published draft 
regulations that provide the details of the new national security review process. A 
detailed summary of the amendments and regulations is included in an extended note 
available at www.vcc.columbia.edu.64  
 
At a time when many jurisdictions, including the U.S. and certain EU members, have or 
are contemplating national security reviews, it is unsurprising that the Canadian 
government has put a similar process in place. Indeed, the Canadian national security 
review raises issues akin to those raised in other jurisdictions with similar tests, including 
uncertainty about the meaning of “national security,” concern that the new test may be 
used to target sovereign investment (particularly in the natural resources and energy 
sectors), and the likelihood of politicization of national security reviews.65  
 
As is the case in new processes, which lack precise statutory or regulatory definition, it is 
unclear how the new test will be applied, and there are reasons to believe that it could be 
applied in a wide range of situations. There are at least three possible dimensions of 
national security: (1) economic welfare; (2) national security; and (3) super-national 
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security.66 The application of any of these dimensions to a merger review raises the 
possibility that a potential transaction that will increase economic efficiencies is rejected 
for political reasons. First, an interest in economic welfare may raise concerns that 
domestic industries should be protected from being bought out by foreign investors. In 
the past, producers of “clothespin[s], peanut[s], pottery, shoe[s], pen[s], paper and 
pencil[s]” in jurisdictions around the world have invoked the economic welfare 
dimension of national security to protect their industry.67 Second, an interest in national 
security may refer to a concern that sectors of a country’s economy that are strategically 
sensitive for defense reasons should not be owned by foreign companies. Finally, an 
interest in super-national security may refer to the overarching imperative to “protect the 
homeland” from investment by countries that are viewed as a security risk. 
 
Recently, it could be argued that the federal government and Canadian public view all 
three of these dimensions as relevant to national security reviews in Canada. Successive 
federal governments have expressed concern over investments by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in Canadian businesses, exemplified by public debate over inbound investments 
by United Arab Emirates' SOEs and the issuance of review guidelines under the ICA 
specific to SOEs.68 The current government’s decision (seemingly supported by all 
parties) to block the Alliant/MDA transaction on the basis of arguably unusual concerns 
relating to U.S. access to surveillance technology further suggests that there is political 
will to consider similar restrictions on defense related acquisitions, even emanating from 
countries like the U.S.  
 
Finally, public concern over the alleged “hollowing out” of corporate Canada, whether 
through elimination of Canadian head offices, stock exchange listings or reduced R&D 
has been apparent in the context of high profile acquisitions of Canadian businesses. 
Indeed, the consultation undertaken by the federal government, which preceded passage 
of the amendments to the ICA, explicitly considered the issue in its deliberations, and did 
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not rule out the possibility, for example, that the loss of Canadian head offices due to 
foreign acquisitions of Canadian businesses could have negative consequences for the 
Canadian economy, though it did not recommend further direct restrictions on foreign 
investment.69  
 
When these tendencies are considered in light of the breadth of the national security test, 
the federal government should be cautious in adopting an over-expansive approach to the 
application of the new test. The above tendencies demonstrate the country’s 
preoccupations with national champions, Canadian control over natural resources and 
domestic head offices. Allowing these preoccupations to dominate a national security 
review would counter the intended purpose of the test, and instead of functioning as a 
transparent tool to be used by the federal government in the limited circumstances in 
which foreign investment may threaten Canada’s national security, the national security 
test would become a meaningless catchphrase to be touted against unpopular, but 
legitimate foreign investments. Having said this, and as of the writing of this Chapter, the 
seemingly smooth progress (to date) of the recently announced acquisition by China 
Investment Corporation (CIC) of a minority voting interest in Teck Resources Ltd. (a 
major Canadian mining concern) under the new national security test is a welcome sign.70 
This transaction, involving a leading Chinese sovereign wealth fund acquiring a stake in a 
Canadian natural resource company, was precisely the type of acquisition that was to be 
scrutinized under the new test.  
 
Foreign investors considering investments that could be subject to the new process will 
also have to adjust to a review process that is no longer primarily administrative, but 
essentially political. The national security review process is highly consultative in nature, 
and invites input from the cabinet of the federal government, departments of the federal 
government, as well as provinces affected by the transaction. All of these constituencies 
are heavily influenced by public concern about high profile transactions, especially those 
that are the subject of extensive media comment. Prudent foreign investors are well 
advised to recognize this at an early stage of their planning and to consider government 
relations and public relations strategies that are consistent with the approach taken to 
review under the ICA. Investors who appreciate the multifaceted nature of the Canadian 
foreign investment review process will have the most success in securing ministerial 
approval in a timely and acceptable manner. 
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Chapter 21 
 
Is a model EU BIT possible – or even desirable? 
 
Armand de Mestral C.M.* 
 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which entered into force 
on December 1, 2009, extends the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) articles 206 and 
207 to embrace “foreign direct investment.” This raises the question of whether the EU is 
now in a position to adopt a model BIT articulating a common policy on foreign direct 
investment (FDI). An EU policy on FDI could replace the disparate efforts of the 27 
member states, complementing and reinforcing their efforts and presenting a stronger 
image to the world, especially at a time when the EU appears to have lost ground to other 
jurisdictions as a preferred destination for FDI.71  
 
Suggesting the preparation of an EU model BIT for treaty relations with third states 
assumes that the EU is empowered to do so and has the competence to negotiate and 
ultimately to implement any such agreement. However, despite the expansion of the CCP 
to include FDI, there remain many doubts as to the capacity of the EU to embark on such 
a course alone. The obstacles are at once political (the reluctance of member states to 
abandon their authority here) and legal (the limited competence under the CCP to 
regulate the internal market). In this context, three models can be envisaged: (1) a BIT 
binding all EU member states and concluded by the EU alone; (2) a BIT concluded as a 
mixed agreement (signed by both the EU and each member state); or (3) a BIT relating to 
EU action alone. Given the circumstances, the negotiation and implementation of a model 
BIT may only be possible as a mixed agreement with the willing concurrence of member 
states.  
 
EU competence over the CCP is exclusive, which has led some to suggest that member 
states must cease to negotiate BITs now that TFEU articles 206 and 207 are in place.72 
However, it is by no means clear what the new CCP competence embraces. The CCP has 
been read by the European Court of Justice to focus essentially outward, seemingly 
giving the EU authority to set the conditions for admission of foreign investment into the 
internal market, including the types of FDI and investors allowed and the conditions at 
the point of entry. But it is not clear that the CCP covers regulation of the standards of 
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 The author wishes to thank Marc Bungenberg, Jan Winter, Joern Griebel and Thomas Eilmansberger for 
their helpful comments on this chapter. It was first published as a Perspective on March 24, 2010. 
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 See chapter 9 above, José Guimón, “It’s time for an EU investment promotion agency”. 
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 Marc Bungenberg, “The politics of the European Union`s investment treaty making,” in Tomer Broude, 
Marc L. Busch and Amy Porges, eds., The politics of international economic law (Cambridge University 
Press, forthcoming), at 17, working paper available at: 
http://www.asil.org/files/ielconferencepapers/bungenberg.pdf; Christian Tietje, ‘Die 
Außenwirtschaftsverfassung der EU nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon,’ Beiträge zum Transnationalen 
Wirtschaftsrecht, vol. 83 (2009), p. 19.  
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treatment of FDI in the internal market, as well as guarantees against performance 
requirements and expropriation. The TFEU does not define “foreign direct investment,” 
and the definition seems to exclude portfolio investment. It is also uncertain that the EU 
could commit to all forms of investor state arbitration. Certainly it could not commit to 
ICSID procedures, as it is not a state. A further complication, which it shares with several 
federal states, is that it may not be able to recover the damages that it might be 
condemned to pay on behalf of member states’ peccadilloes.  
 
Given these limitations, a unilateral EU BIT would not be the equivalent of the standard 
BITs between member states and third states: hardly an attractive negotiating position 
from which to start. Further questions remain:  Would an EU BIT protect only against EU 
action or against the acts of all member states? If MFN and national treatment are 
offered, what will be the comparator – the EU or member states’ action? Would the EU 
seek to renegotiate the hundreds of BITs with third states? If this were attempted, there 
are many pitfalls in renegotiating BITs, at least with those countries that are already 
actively seeking to get out of their existing BIT obligations. In this regard it should be 
noted that hundreds of “outdated” air transport bilateral agreements still remain in place 
due to inertia and the difficulties of renegotiation. 
 
A related legal issue is posed by the 191 existing BITs between member states. Are they 
to disappear as did air transport bilateral agreements when EU competence over air 
transportation was exercised after 1989? So far, only the Czech Republic is willing to 
abandon its intra-EU BITs – perhaps because it has been an unsuccessful respondent in 
several investor-state claims? 
 
One should note that there is already a partial model EU BIT: the Minimum Platform for 
Investment for the EU FTAs. This is a curious document prepared by the Directorate 
General for Trade in 2006,73 focused primarily on establishment and trade in financial 
services providing investment services. It provides guidance to negotiators of EU trade 
agreements who may have a mandate to include provisions related to investment. It does 
not read like a standard BIT, and it would have to be considerably amended and 
expanded to serve as a genuine model BIT. 
 
Surely a common legal standard regulating FDI in the EU is an eminently sensible goal: it 
would replace 27 competing jurisdictions with one high standard of protection; it would 
allow the EU to present a common face to the world on FDI issues; and it would serve as 
a powerful incentive to promoting global standards. But it would be foolish to minimize 
the obstacles that lie in the path of this laudable goal. 
                                                 
73
 Council of the EU, Brussels 6 March 2009, 7242/09, Limited; first issued as Minimum platform on 
investment for EU FTAs – Provision on establishment in template for a Title on “Establishment, trade in 
services and e-commerce,” Note to The 133 Committee, European Commission DG Trade, Brussels, 28 
July 2006, D (2006) 9219. It must be noted that this document, although available on several NGO 
websites, has never been officially issued. Requests under freedom of information have been denied. 
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Chapter 22 
 
How much do U.S. corporations know (and care) about bilateral 
investment treaties? Some hints from new survey evidence 
 
Jason Webb Yackee* 
 
A remarkable number of countries have recently entered into bilateral investment treaties 
as a means of protecting and promoting inward foreign direct investment. But do the 
treaties “work"? In exchange for giving up some measure of regulatory autonomy, host 
countries hope to receive increased flows of investment. Scholars have devoted 
substantial energy to examining whether this so-called “grand bargain” has in fact been 
realized. Most studies follow a common research design. The number of BITs that a 
country has signed are counted up, with the resulting independent variable regressed 
against country-level FDI flow data. Unfortunately, the results of these various and 
increasingly complex statistical exercises are inconsistent.74 Some studies show that BITs 
can have massive positive impacts on foreign investment; others show modest positive 
impacts; others show no impact at all, or even a negative impact. 
 
A small handful of scholars are attempting to move past this econometric stalemate by 
returning to the older, less sophisticated, but potentially more enlightening methodologies 
of surveys and interviews.75 In a recent working paper, I presented results from a mail-
based survey of general counsels in large U.S. corporations. General Counsels were 
targeted because it is unlikely that busy non-legal senior executives will be in a position 
to monitor or evaluate the highly technical and relatively inaccessible evolution of BIT 
jurisprudence. If investment treaties meaningfully impact FDI, that influence is likely to 
flow into the corporation’s decision-making process through the General Counsels’ 
knowledge or appreciation of BITs as risk-reducing devices.  
 
The survey was mailed to General Counsels in the top 200 U.S. corporations on the 
Fortune 500 list. 75 surveys were returned, a relatively respectable response rate given 
the nature of the respondents, who are, undoubtedly, exceedingly busy. Given the modest 
sample size, and given that I was able to focus only on General Counsels in U.S. 
corporations, the survey’s results should be viewed as preliminary rather than definitive. 
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Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and 
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 See, e.g., Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, “The importance of BITs for foreign direct investment and political 
risk insurance: revisiting the evidence”, in Karl P. Sauvant, ed., Yearbook on International Investment Law 
and Policy, 2009-2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), ch. 14. 
  75 
Responses were received from corporations across the top 200, including four in the top 
ten, and included corporations from all major economic sectors. 
 
The basic story is a somewhat surprising one given some claims in the existing empirical 
literature that BITs matter a great deal to foreign investors. General Counsels reported 
that they personally were relatively unfamiliar with BITs. On a five-point scale, ranging 
from “1” (“not at all familiar”) to 5 (“very familiar”), the median response for General 
Counsels was only a “2”, with only about 21 percent indicating high familiarity (“4” or 
“5”).76 General Counsels reported an identical median level of unfamiliarity with BITs by 
non-lawyer senior executives.77 General Counsels did not view BITs as providing 
particularly effective protection against expropriation (median response of “3” on a 5-
point scale where “5” means “very effective” and “1” means “not at all effective”), with 
only about 21 percent rating BITs as highly effective (“4” or “5”).78 They were even less 
impressed with BITs as an effective shield against adverse regulatory change (median 
response of “2”, with no respondents selecting “5” and only 10 percent selecting “4”).79 
 
This latter result is intriguing, because classic expropriation has become an exceedingly 
rare phenomenon. If BITs have an important role to play in reducing investment risk (and 
thus in encouraging FDI), it is probably by reducing the risk of adverse regulatory change 
– so-called “regulatory expropriation.” In fact, General Counsel’s skepticism about the 
ability of BITs to protect against regulatory change is consistent with the jurisprudence of 
arbitral tribunals, which have so far refused to read an ambitious regulatory takings 
doctrine into the treaties. General Counsels also indicated that, on average, BITs are not 
an important consideration in the “typical” FDI decision (median response rate of “2” on 
the five-point scale, where “1” is “not at all important”),80 and only four respondents 
reported that their company had declined to invest in a specific project because of the 
absence of BIT protections.81 Interestingly, those four companies that said that a BIT had 
impacted a specific project spanned the Fortune 200 (two are in the top 10, one is in the 
60s, and one is in the 170s) and included a variety of sectors. One is a defense-industries 
corporation; one is a natural resources company; one is a large manufacturing 
conglomerate; and one is a financial services company.  
 
Given the small and geographically non-diverse sample, the survey results should 
certainly not be understood as saying that BITs never matter to investors when they 
decide whether and where to invest. Nor do they prove that BITs will not matter more to 
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 The question read, “How familiar are lawyers in your office with the basic provisions of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs)?” 
77
 The question read, “How familiar are nonlawyer senior executives in your corporation with the basic 
provisions of BITs?” 
78
 The question read, “In your view, how effective are international treaties like BITs at protecting 
foreign investments from expropriation by a foreign government?” 
79
 The question read, “In your view, how effective are international treaties like BITs at protecting 
foreign investments from adverse regulatory change in the foreign country?” 
80
 The question read, “How important is the presence or absence of a BIT to your company’s typical 
decision to invest in a foreign country?” 
81
 The question read, “To your knowledge, has your company ever declined to invest (or to consider 
investing) in a particular foreign project specifically because of the absence of a BIT?” 
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investors at some time in the future, as knowledge of BITs and confidence in the strength 
of their protections grow. BITs may indeed influence certain investment decisions. But 
my survey results suggest that they are unlikely to influence many others. 
 
Of course, there are serious methodological challenges with surveys such as this one. But 
econometric studies of the links between BITs and FDI inflows have reached the point of 
diminishing returns. In order to provide a more certain answer to the question of whether 
BITs “work”, researchers should re-focus their energies on exploring in more depth and 
with more sophistication how and why corporate knowledge and appreciation of BITs 
does – or does not – actually enter into the corporation’s foreign investment decision-
making process. 
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Chapter 23 
 
U.S. BITs and financial stability 
 
Kevin P. Gallagher* 
   
Almost immediately after taking office, the Obama administration charged the U.S. 
Department of State’s Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy with 
reviewing the U.S. Model bilateral investment treaty (BIT). The group established a sub-
committee of business groups, labor and environmental organizations, and a handful of 
academic experts and tasked it to make official recommendations for reforming U.S. 
investment treaties. When completed, the Obama administration hopes to proceed with 
official negotiations with China, India, Vietnam, and possibly Brazil.  
 
In light of the global financial crisis, one of the specific issues that the administration 
asked the subcommittee to address was the potential impact of BIT provisions on the 
ability of governments to prevent and mitigate financial crises. Financial stability was one 
of the few areas in which a consensus recommendation was reached – the subcommittee 
asked the administration to undertake a legal review of the prudential measures exception 
(Article 20 of the U.S. Model BIT).82 In most recent U.S. treaties that exception states 
that parties to the treaty should “not be prevented from adopting or maintaining measures 
… to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.” However, the paragraph 
ends with the following sentence: “Where such measures do not conform with the 
provisions of this Treaty, they shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Party’s 
commitments or obligations under this Treaty.” Some on the subcommittee thought the 
language was vague and in need of clarification. Others echoed the concerns of legal 
scholars who argue that the sentences were self-canceling and in need of deletion.83 
Given the high degree of contention among committee members, the report includes an 
annex in which individual members or subgroups provided additional arguments. A 
group of sub-committee members (that included myself) recommended that the 
administration conduct a legal review of the potential that any of the measures 
implemented or under consideration in response to the financial crisis might be 
inconsistent with the 2004 Model BIT, and made three specific recommendations that 
should be implemented by the U.S. in a revised Model BIT:  
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1.  Codify the State Department’s position in Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States regarding 
the standard of proof for identifying principles of customary international law and the 
minimum standard of treatment.  
Financial bailout measures, or future preventative measures that create “too big too fail” 
regulations, could be challenged under the 2004 BIT on the grounds that they deny a 
foreign investor’s right to fair and equitable treatment and a minimum standard of 
treatment. Indeed, a Dutch subsidiary of a Japanese bank recently argued that the Czech 
Republic had violated its rights by extending its bailout program only to “too big to fail” 
Czech banks, excluding a small bank in which the Dutch subsidiary had invested.84 In 
addition to ensuring that the prudential exception is broad enough, codifying the Glamis 
position, which prevailed with a narrow interpretation of customary international law and 
minimum standard of treatment, will set a better standard for preventing and mitigating 
crises.  
   
2. Include a safeguard provision for balance-of-payments crises that is not subject to 
investor-state dispute settlement.  
U.S. investment treaties essentially force nations to liberalize their capital accounts, 
regardless of their institutional capacity – or be prepared literally to pay the 
consequences. This stands in stark contrast with economic science and most other global 
treaties. Ayhan Kose of the IMF, Eswar Prasad of Cornell University and Ashley Taylor 
of the World Bank confirm that capital account liberalization is not correlated with 
economic growth in developing countries. These authors expand such findings to show 
that capital account liberalization only works for those nations above a certain threshold 
of economic and institutional development.85 Capital controls have been shown to be an 
effective measure to prevent or mitigate a crisis and such a safeguard mechanism leaving 
governments room to impose capital controls under certain circumstances can be found in 
virtually every other form of international economic law, such as the WTO, OECD codes 
(and the draft MAI), and the BITs of most other capital exporting nations. 
 
3. Exclude “sovereign debt” from “definitions” of an investment.  
The U.S. Model BIT does not explicitly exclude sovereign debt from the definition of 
covered investments, as NAFTA does. It should. The U.S. government is the largest 
issuer of sovereign debt, and countries across the world have taken on much debt to get 
out of the financial crises and could risk default. As noted in the full subcommittee report, 
the IMF and others have raised concerns that efforts to restructure sovereign debt may 
give rise to investor-state claims. New model investment provisions should not obstruct 
global efforts to set up adequate facilities for sovereign debt restructuring that could be 
undermined if bondholders are able to circumvent such mechanisms by filing claims 
under BITs. At minimum, the model BIT should codify U.S.-Peru FTA-like provisions 
that limit an investor's ability to bring an investor-state claim based on a debt 
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restructuring where holders of 75% or more of the outstanding debt have agreed to the 
restructuring. 
 
Ensuring that the U.S. model is in tune with global efforts to prevent and mitigate 
financial crises benefits both the U.S. and its investment partners. Making sure that ample 
prudential exceptions exist can buffer the U.S. from liabilities for prudential regulations. 
What’s more, stability among our investment partners helps U.S. investors and exporters 
have more certainty for markets. Crises could lead to defaults and large losses to U.S. 
assets and export markets. And, crises can cause contagion that spreads to other U.S. 
investment and export destinations. Trade and investment treaties should not prevail over 
regulations for financial stability in the U.S. and abroad.  
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Chapter 24 
 
Political risk insurance and bilateral investment treaties: a view from 
below 
 
Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen* 
 
Many of the risks covered by bilateral investment treaties are also covered by political 
risk insurance (PRI). Although there are important differences between PRI and BITs, 
both in terms of coverage and underlying purpose, the considerable overlap between the 
two instruments suggest that PRI providers should take BITs into account when assessing 
the risk of investment projects. But while the relationship between BITs and PRI has 
often been alleged to be considerable,86 in practice there is practically no publicly 
available evidence to sustain this assumption. This Chapter reviews evidence from a 
recent survey of officials in private and public (or mixed private-public) PRI providers.87  
 
Government-sponsored agencies 
Several governments provide their investors abroad with insurance against political risks, 
and a few of these, such as those of Germany and France, make their guarantees 
contingent on investments being covered by BITs. This is notable because practically all 
BITs allow government-sponsored PRI agencies to “subrogate” insured investors’ claims 
against host countries, thereby providing a legal basis for the government’s insurance 
agency to recover benefits paid out to investors. These programs are an exception, 
however, in that most public investment guarantee programs do not incorporate BITs as a 
precondition for coverage. And while BITs may at times provide comfort when PRI 
agencies of capital-exporting states issue guarantees in risky jurisdictions, interviews with 
officials from nine of them indicate that it is exceptionally rare that the treaties have a 
decisive impact on either coverage or pricing. 88 
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 Covered countries are, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
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The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
For MIGA insurance, a foreign investment has adequate legal protection if covered by a 
BIT, and the treaties are relevant for other parts of MIGA’s operational regulations as 
well. But whereas BITs may thereby make the underwriting process easier within MIGA, 
the treaties are often not crucial. A BIT is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for 
coverage. And with respect to the pricing of expropriation risk, MIGA has to consider no 
less than 57 rating factors when determining the underwriting premium rates. Only one of 
these relate to the existence of an “investment protection agreement” – a rather broad 
term which covers trade agreements with investment chapters, for instance, the Energy 
Charter Treaty. Suffice it to say that, if countries engage in conduct that signals a scale-
back of investor protections – such as withdrawing their consent to submit investment 
disputes to international arbitration – that would naturally be factored into MIGA’s 
underwriting decisions. But for developing countries that remain committed to foreign 
investment and the rule of law, past and current high-ranking officials confirm that the 
absence of a BIT rarely impacts pricing or coverage, and is never in itself a sufficient 
reason for MIGA to withhold a guarantee. 
 
Private providers 
As an alternative to public investment guarantee schemes, private companies have 
offered PRI for the past three decades. The survey summarized here included feedback 
from underwriters and senior managers from firms and Lloyds’ syndicates accounting for 
around 50% of the total “confiscation, expropriation and nationalization” capacity of 
most PRI providers. Their feedback may appear surprising to those convinced that BITs 
are crucial for the PRI industry. A few providers incorporate BITs into their products (for 
instance by insuring treaty-based arbitration award defaults), and some occasionally use 
the treaties as a guiding tool when assessing investment risks, but most private firms find 
BITs largely irrelevant for the underwriting process. Naturally, if cancelling or failing to 
honor existing BITs can be taken as signals that a host country plans to weaken its 
investor protections, this will be noted and taken into account (as with MIGA). But for 
developing countries that treat foreign investors fairly and in a non-discriminatory way, 




Naturally, what has been discussed here is only one out of several possible links between 
BITs and PRI. An additional – and obviously related – question is the relevance of BITs 
when PRI providers resolve claims with host governments. This remains almost entirely 
unexplored in the literature due to the short supply of information about the PRI industry. 
The conclusion is nevertheless notable: While BITs are basically aimed at reducing the 
risk of investing abroad, many agencies that price the risk of foreign investments rarely 
take them into account. Why might that be? If the reason is ignorance about the potency 
of BITs among some PRI providers, then the treaties should increase in importance once 
more underwriters realize their potential. But even among those well informed about 
BITs, major providers remain skeptical about their practical relevance as a risk-mitigating 
tool. Ultimately, however, it remains to be studied exactly why BITs may be decisive for 
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some underwriting decisions, but have nevertheless not had a transformative impact on 
the global market for PRI.  
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Chapter 25 
 
International investment arbitration: winning, losing and why 
 
Susan D. Franck* 
 
We know several things about foreign investment. First, foreign investment matters, 
reaching US$ 1.7 trillion in 2008. Second, we know that foreign investors have new 
international law rights to protect their economic interests. Third, we know that those 
rights are now being used. So since we now know that the international legal risk is not 
illusory, the real questions are: who wins, who loses and why? While various 
commentators have asserted a variety of answers to those questions, many have done so 
without reference to valid and reliable data.89 In its most benign form, these observations 
create misinformation, but perhaps more troublingly, might also lead to policy choices 
based upon unrepresentative anecdotal evidence, supposition or political rhetoric. To help 
alleviate these possible outcomes, this Chapter reviews recent empirical research90 in 
order to provide basic information to fundamental questions about investment treaty 
arbitration (ITA) to create a more accurate framework for policy choices and dispute-
resolution strategies.  
 
So who does win and lose international investment treaty arbitration? The answer is: both 
foreign investors and host states win and lose.91 The data suggest, however, that they lose 
in reasonably equivalent proportions. Not including the disputes that ended with an award 
embodying a settlement, respondent governments, for example, won approximately 58% 
of the time. Meanwhile, investors won 39% of the cases.92 
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Winning and losing, however, is not just about whether there is a breach of the 
underlying investment treaty. The amount awarded is also critical. Despite the fact that 
investors claimed US$ 343 million in damages on average, that is not what they received. 
Rather, tribunals awarded investors only US$ 10 million on average. This US$ 333 
million difference is not insubstantial, and it may give investors a basis for some 
reflection about the value of arbitration – particularly given the need to pay the arbitral 
tribunal and the other legal costs associated with bringing a claim.93  
 
Knowing which parties actually win and lose begs a further question – namely: why are 
parties successful? This question is critical given suggestions that ITA is potentially 
biased.94 There has been some debate about whether respondents’ development status or 
whether arbitrators come from the developing world improperly affects outcome. If these 
development variables cause particular results, this would raise issues about the integrity 
of investment treaties and arbitration.  
 
To address this critical issue, recent research considered whether there was a reliable 
statistical link between the level of development and ITA outcomes. The results suggest 
that development variables did not generally cause particular outcomes. One study found 
that there was no relationship between a government’s level of development and the 
outcome of ITA.95 A second study then showed that – at a general level – outcome was 
not reliably associated with the development status of the respondent, the development 
status of the presiding arbitrator, or some interaction between those two variables. This 
held true for both: (1) winning or losing investment treaty arbitration, and (2) amounts 
tribunals awarded against governments. Follow-up tests in the same study showed, 
however, that there were two statistically significant effects – found in one sub-set of 
potentially non-representative cases – that suggest arbitration must be used carefully in 
certain situations. Only where the presiding arbitrator was from a middle income country, 
the data showed that high income countries received statistically lower awards than: (1) 
upper-middle income respondents, and (2) low income respondents. Nevertheless, in 
other circumstances involving middle income presiding arbitrators or all cases involving 
presiding arbitrators from high-income countries, the amounts awarded were statistically 
equivalent.96 In other words, in limited circumstances, tribunals with presiding arbitrators 
from middle-income countries made awards that tended to favor developed countries and 
were different than one might expect from chance alone.  
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The overall results cast doubt on the arguments that: (1) ITA is the equivalent of tossing a 
two-headed coin to decide disputes, (2) the developing world is treated unfairly in ITA, 
and (3) arbitrators from the developed and developing world decide cases differently. The 
evidence creates a basis for cautious optimism about the integrity of ITA and suggests 
radical overhaul, rejection or rebalancing of these procedural rights is not necessarily 
warranted. While the follow-up tests and limitations of the data suggest optimism must be 
tempered properly, a sensible approach would involve creating targeted solutions to 
address particularized problems and enacting targeted reforms to redress perceived 
concerns about the international investment regime.  
 
Ultimately, the data suggest that investors and governments won and lost in relatively 
equal measure, but governments won a bit more. While the data show also that, when 
they did win, investors ended up with substantially less than they requested. Moreover, 
the data do not establish that a respondent’s development status was a reason why 
investors or governments were successful in pursuing arbitration. This suggests that why 
a party wins or loses arbitration may ultimately have more to do with factors other than 
development, such as the merits of a particular claim or defense. Other factors may also 
be linked with outcome, such as the business sector involved, the amounts claimed or the 
type of host state government, but they may not necessarily cause particular results. This 
suggests that although there are risks in pursing arbitration, there will be times when it is 
warranted and, ultimately, parties should think carefully about why arbitration is in their 
interests. 
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Chapter 26 
 




As arbitration has grown by leaps and bounds, so has the role of the party-appointed 
arbitrator. Surprisingly, this has not led to increased inquiry into the appropriateness of 
having arbitrators appointed by the parties in general, or in arbitrations against states in 
particular. In my judgment, party-appointed arbitrators should be banned unless their role 
as advocates for the party that appointed them is fully disclosed and accepted. Until this 
is done, arbitration can never meet its aspiration of providing dispassionate adjudication 
by those with special skills and experience in a process designed to combine efficiency 
with expertise. 
 
The incentive of the party and its counsel is to appoint an arbitrator who will win the case 
for them. That incentive will be particularly strong when its case, on its merits, is not 
particularly strong. It may well be argued that it is a lawyer’s duty to appoint someone 
who is most likely to obtain the best result for the client, regardless of whether, 
objectively, the law and the facts favor its case. Once selected, an arbitrator’s personal 
incentive is to secure reemployment by providing his or her party with a favorable 
outcome. This is not necessarily bad. In U.S. domestic arbitration, a party-appointed 
arbitrator is exactly that: an advocate on the panel. If that is clear, fully disclosed and 
accepted, it adds another option to the arbitral process. But in international arbitration, the 
party-appointed arbitrator is expected to be objective and impartial. I believe the reality is 
that many, if not most, of those party-appointed arbitrators respond to their personal 
incentives and become to a certain extent party advocates within a system that expects 
them to behave objectively. The subject of repeat arbitrators, irrespective of who appoints 
them, poses additional difficulties to the international arbitrations system that cannot be 
discussed in this short article.97 
 
I believe true objectivity is possible only if all arbitrators are prepared to rule against the 
party that appointed them exactly as if they had been sitting as sole arbitrators. In my 
experience, that condition is not met in most cases. I have personally encountered this 
pressure. While I made clear to the lawyer who selected me that I would decide the case 
on its merits, I could not help feeling influenced by the knowledge that the lawyer who 
appointed me had done so because he had judged that that would best serve his client’s 
interests. While Alexis Mourre argued that party-appointed arbitrators are selected for 
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their reputation of impartiality,98 I disagree. I believe that lawyers feel that their duty to 
advocate for their clients’ interests takes precedence over institutional concerns. 
 
Even if arbitrators are willing to rule against the party that appointed them, there are still 
ways in which they can influence the final outcome of a case to favor their party. For 
example, they may try to persuade the other panel members to reduce the award in favor 
of their party in return for joining them in a unanimous award. This compromise will 
ordinarily be attractive to the chair of the panel, for his or her reputation for obtaining 
unanimous awards may increase the likelihood of being appointed to future panels. Even 
if the award is not affected, the party-appointed arbitrator may bargain for not awarding 
counsel fees. The panel has a great deal of leeway in that regard, and party-appointed 
arbitrators may save the parties that appointed them a great deal of money by eliminating 
counsel fees or reducing the size of the awards. 
 
It might be argued that these are relatively minor disadvantages, that there is virtually 
always reason for compromise and that this is an acceptable price to be paid. But it is not 
only untoward compromises that the institution of party-appointed arbitrators promotes. 
The presence of a partisan arbitrator on a panel will normally reduce, if not eliminate, the 
free exchange of ideas among the members of the panel. The chair will be less receptive 
to arguments that appear to be moved by partisan considerations or may join one of the 
arbitrators, with the result that the other party-appointed arbitrators feel excluded from 
the deliberations. The Lauder arbitration against the Czech Republic provides an 
excellent example of these dynamics. In that case, a party-appointed arbitrator stated that 
he had been excluded from the panel discussion. I believe it was the response of a party-
appointed arbitrator to these structural incentives that caused one of the great failures of 
international arbitration, the Multinovic arbitration. 
 
This conflation of personal and professional incentives is particularly inappropriate in 
international investment disputes, in which arbitral decisions can affect the state and its 
people. Decisions binding them should not be rendered by privately selected arbitrators, 
but by arbitrators selected by truly neutral institutions. The drafters of the ICSID 
Convention realized this by reserving for the ICSID Secretariat the power to appoint the 
members of the panels that review first-instance decisions. In my judgment, all arbitrators 
sitting in investment disputes should be appointed by a neutral institution; bilateral 
investment treaties should be amended to achieve this. International investment 
arbitration would thus set a potent example for general emulation in international 
arbitrations. 
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Chapter 27 
 
State-controlled entities as claimants in international investment 
arbitration: an early assessment 
 
Michael D. Nolan and Frédéric G. Sourgens* 
 
State-controlled entities (SCEs) are increasingly important participants in international 
investment flows and international trade. Cumulative FDI by sovereign wealth funds has 
reportedly reached US$100 billion. SWFs are significant equity investors in, and provide 
significant debt financing to, every kind of company, from professional sports franchises 
to container ports. In addition to the role of these funds, national oil companies are 
growing in regional and international importance. In many countries, other industries are 
also increasingly government-owned.  
 
Not surprisingly, SCEs already act as claimants in contractual arbitrations, frequently 
conducted ad hoc or under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules. Examples from the 2009 
American Lawyer Arbitration Scorecard include arbitrations instituted by the National 
Property Fund of the Czech Republic against Nomura Bank, as well as by Sonatrach, the 
Algerian national gas company, against Repsol and British Petroleum.99 Contractual 
arbitration thus may sidestep many of the complex issues treaty arbitrations may raise for 
SCEs. With that said, SCE cases may encounter some unique issues at the enforcement 
stage. The New York Convention allows the following reservation by member states: 
“This State will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal 
relationships, whether contractual or not, that are considered commercial under the 
national law.” This reservation has been made by such diverse states as Argentina, China, 
Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, India, Nigeria, the Philippines, the United States, and 
Venezuela.100 Whether a dispute involving an SCE as Claimant would be considered 
“commercial” under the national law of these states may differ from situation to situation 
– leaving some SCE claimants with potential enforcement issues depending upon the case 
and jurisdiction in which enforcement might be sought. 
 
How and when SCEs can participate in international investment arbitration, as opposed to 
strictly contractual arbitrations, likely soon will emerge as a complex question. SCEs 
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facing a dispute with a host state government to which an international investment 
agreement (IIA) could apply may wish to use treaty arbitration as an alternative or 
additional means of dispute resolution. SCEs may prefer the enforcement mechanisms of 
the ICSID Convention. SCEs may consider that host state treatment violated a treaty 
provision without breaching the underlying contract. Finally, SCEs may seek to invoke 
access to market provisions in bilateral investment treaties if an investment contract is not 
concluded or revoked at an early stage in a transaction for the SCEs deems to be 
improper political reasons. 
 
SCE treaty claims face two different types of jurisdictional hurdles: first, a SCE must 
satisfy the requirements of the underlying IIA; second, in the case of ICSID arbitration, 
the SCE also must fall within the scope of the ICSID Convention. SCEs can invoke IIAs 
only if they are qualifying “investors”. Most definitions of “investors” in IIAs were 
drafted prior to considerations of SCE claimants. Some refer to “legal entities, including 
company, association, partnership and other organization, incorporated or constituted 
under the laws and regulations of either Contracting Party and have their headquarters in 
that Contracting Party.”101 Others, such as the definition of Saudi investors in the bilateral 
investment agreement between Saudi Arabia and the People’s Republic of China, include 
expressly “Institutions and authorities such as the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
Public Funds, Development Agencies and other similar governmental institutions having 
their head offices in Saudi Arabia.”102 This issue will have to be parsed on a case-by-case 
basis. But as the Saudi example shows, treaties may expressly include some SCEs in the 
definition of investor. 
 
The ICSID Convention may present additional hurdles. The ICSID Convention applies to 
disputes of host states and nationals of other states and not to disputes between two states. 
Whether an SCE is a “national” may be subject to a formal or a functional analysis. Many 
ICSID tribunals have applied a functional test that looks to whether the SCE acted as an 
agent of the state or performed a state function. This question also must be addressed on a 
case-by-case basis.103 
 
The role of SCEs as claimants in international investment arbitrations likely will evolve 
in the near future. It can be anticipated that, in some instances at least, these arbitrations 
will run in parallel to contract arbitrations. A key question in treaty arbitrations will be 
whether the SCE qualifies as an “investor” under the treaty. Similarly, SCE claims will 
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explore the limits of disputes between two states and disputes between a state and a 
national of another state under the ICSID Convention. The answer to both questions will 
inform the ongoing global policy debate about the proper role of SCEs in international 
investment flows. 
 
Given that jurisprudence and scholarship are still in an early stage of development, the 
challenge may be resolved first at the treaty drafting stage. As the example of the Saudi 
treaty shows, treaty parties may, if deliberate about the potential issues associated with 
SCEs acting as claimants, reflect their specific intentions in their negotiated definition of 
the term “investor.” With progress on the treaty front, it is to be expected that the issues 
faced by tribunals applying IIAs, as well as the ICSID Convention, similarly would 
become clearer. Until that time, however, each case will have to be examined on its own 
merits. What can be said at this point is that it is likely that some SCEs would pass muster 
under both IIAs and the ICSID Convention in some instances. The trick is the question: 
which instances? 
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Chapter 28 
 
International investment law and media disputes: a complement to 
WTO law 
 
Luke Eric Peterson* 
 
The recent high-stakes dispute between Google and China over censorship and cyber-
security has spawned renewed discussion of the international trade law protections that 
Internet and media companies may enjoy.104 Less recognized, however, is a perhaps more 
powerful legal tool in the arsenal of Internet and media companies engaging in cross-
border investments, namely international investment law.105 
 
A vast architecture of international treaties has been established to protect flows of 
foreign direct investment from discriminatory or arbitrary treatment, (uncompensated) 
expropriation, and other forms of mistreatment by host country governments. Legal 
disputes under these investment protection treaties are on the rise, with foreign investors 
often taking advantage of dispute settlement mechanisms that permit them to sue a host 
government for cash damages in case of alleged breach of treaty obligations. Moreover, a 
small but growing number of international arbitrations taking place between foreign 
investors and governments arise out of disputes over the treatment of media enterprises. 
These cases offer tantalizing hints as to the broad potential impact of investment 
protection treaties to advance freedom of expression and freedom of the media – as well 
as some hints as to the limitations of these international investment pacts. 
 
Uses of BITs by media organizations 
Where media actors are wholly or partially foreign-owned, there may be scope to 
challenge a wide range of government actions as breaches of investment protection 
treaties. Such treaties provide specific legal protections for failure by the host state to 
compensate for direct or indirect expropriations or for breach of international investment 
law standards such as “fair & equitable treatment”, “full protection & security” or 
“national treatment”. Similar legal protections are also found in a growing number of 
Free Trade Agreements, including the North American FTA (NAFTA), Central American 
FTA (CAFTA) and numerous bilateral FTAs (including US-Peru and US-Singapore). 
While not directly aimed at the protection of expressive rights, those standards may 
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protect foreigners and foreign-controlled organizations from government actions 
designed to limit freedom of expression. For example, if a host state shuts down a 
foreign-controlled media company in reaction to the company’s broadcasting of a speech 
by an opposition leader, a foreign owner might argue that these actions constitute 
expropriation or breach of other international investment law protections such as “fair 
and equitable treatment”. Similarly, if a state refuses to provide a foreign-owned media 
operation with protection from a mob reacting violently to news reporting by that 
company, the foreign owners might argue that the state has breached its obligation to 
provide “full protection and security” to the investment. Foreign-owners of newspapers, 
radio stations, television outlets, and publishing houses have already begun to sue host 
countries on the international playing field for alleged mistreatment.106 Although most of 
these disputes are commercially-oriented and relate to tax, licensing or regulatory 
matters,107 others have touched on politically-motivated expropriations of media outlets 
during military coups or alleged discrimination against publishers who publish political 
opposition literature.108 
 
Challenges and opportunities 
The growing potential for media enterprises to rely on the protections of international 
investment treaties is likely to prompt debate as to the limits of such protections, and the 
discretion afforded to governments to regulate expression so as to uphold public morals, 
national security or other state interests. In a related vein, we may see further debate as to 
the relationship and overlap of investor protection law and human rights law. Already, 
international arbitrators have consulted human rights law for inspiration and guidance 
when dealing with certain investment disputes that touch upon questions of due process 
or denial of justice. It seems likely that, as arbitrators are asked to grapple with disputes 
arising out of alleged censorship or crack-downs on the media, they may look at how 
such matters are handled by human rights courts, and perhaps national courts such as the 
Supreme Court of the United States, even if the rulings of such bodies are not decisive for 
international arbitrators. In particular, arbitrators may look for guidance to the approach 
of human rights adjudicators with respect to permissible limits on freedom of expression, 
for reasons of national security, public safety or other considerations. While not strictly 
binding in the context of investment treaty disputes, human rights law may provide useful 
analogies or insights. 
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Although there are clear signs that media organizations may enjoy some protection under 
international investment treaties, these agreements are not a panacea for the range of 
challenges posed to freedom of expression. Not only are the protections of such treaties 
limited to foreign investors, the structure of such agreements – including the provision of 
costly international arbitration – mean that they are of most use in disputes where large 
sums of money are at stake.109 
Indeed, in an unfortunate twist, arbitration of disputes between media companies and 
governments can sometimes play out in confidence – away from the prying eyes of 
journalists and the public – thanks to the confidentiality that is the default position under 
certain arbitration rules. Thus, whatever its potential value to media enterprises, it should 
be noted that the international law protecting foreign investment could have broader 
impacts upon freedom of expression that need to be closely monitored. Foreign 
investments outside of the media sector, particularly in extractives or energy sectors, can 
be controversial and lead to serious conflict, particularly in developing countries. 
Multinational enterprises sometimes bring pressure to bear upon host countries to crack 
down on local activists or campaigners. At times, foreign investors may argue that 
governments are legally obliged to provide “full protection and security” against local 
critics or campaigners. In such cases, arbitrators will need to ensure that the security-
interests of foreign-owned investments are not permitted to undermine basic norms of 
free dissent and expression. 
 
Conclusion 
There are growing signs that investment treaty protections – while rarely discussed in 
media or human rights law circles – may be surprisingly useful in some cases of 
repression or censorship of foreign-owned media. While there is growing debate as to the 
uses of World Trade Organization agreements to combat certain forms of state repression 
of media actors, less attention has been paid to the potential of international investment 
law to combat certain forms of state censorship and repression. With the U.S. Department 
of State now signaling that Internet freedom should be advanced through U.S. foreign 
policy, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. negotiating position on international 
investment treaties will shift so as to embrace this foreign policy objective. Ongoing 
investment treaty talks between the U.S. and China could provide the obvious forum for 
this issue to be raised and debated.  
                                                 
109
 While effective as a bulwark against expropriation or arbitrary license cancellations, these international 
investment agreements may offer less value in situations where media repression is targeted at particular 
journalists or their reporting methods. See for example the recent battle at the ECHR between the Financial 
Times and the United Kingdom over the protection of confidential journalist sources which appears to be a 
battle over a principle, rather than over large sums of damages incurred by the media organization. 
  94 
Chapter 29 
 
Thinking twice about a gold rush: PacRim Cayman LLC v. El 
Salvador 
 
Gus Van Harten* 
   
Whether it concerns oil drilling or gold mining, sometimes a government, facing new 
circumstances, must change its mind. This reality creates a tension in law between 
encouraging stability and allowing adaptation to new information and new situations. The 
“gold rush” CAFTA lawsuits against El Salvador reveal this tension. 
 
Pacific Rim, a Canadian-based mining firm, has brought one of two gold mining lawsuits 
against El Salvador under CAFTA.110 Since the early 2000s, Pacific Rim has spent 
money looking for gold in El Salvador. It did so under exploration (but notably not 
exploitation) licences that were issued in 1996 and that Pacific Rim acquired in 2002. A 
few years later, after Pacific Rim decided where it wanted to dig, the government had 
adopted a more cautious position on gold mining. So, Pacific Rim has invoked its 
privilege – uniquely available to foreign investors under international law, via investment 
treaties – to sue El Salvador. It argues that the government should have allowed it to mine 
for gold; the government responds that Pacific Rim failed to satisfy steps in the approvals 
process, including an acceptable environmental assessment. Pacific Rim seeks at least 
US$ 77 million for its costs and hoped-for profits. 
 
El Salvador is a small, poor country with precariously few water resources. It lost 20% of 
its surface water in the past 20 years, and 95% of the rest is reportedly contaminated.111 
Industrial gold mining is a recent prospect for the country, and there are serious concerns 
about the risks it poses to people’s health and livelihoods, especially their access to clean 
water. 
 
How should the tension here between stability and change be resolved? 
On the one hand, it seems unfair that a company that put money into exploration should 
be frustrated when applying for permission to exploit what it has found. On the other 
hand, all mining companies must be aware that a government might change its approach 
over time to health and environmental risks of mining. If taxpayers had to compensate 
everyone who lost out in bets on the social or environmental feasibility of a project, this 
would disadvantage those who are more prudent, patient, or environmentally conscious. 
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The question of how the arbitrators in PacRim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador might resolve 
this tension is challenging to answer. Although not the fault of the arbitrators, it raises 
some important concerns. 
First, under CAFTA and other investment treaties, the constraints put on governments are 
both exceptionally potent and highly malleable. This makes it very important, and yet 
very difficult, to assess the legal standards that will apply in particular cases. In numerous 
awards to date, tribunals have interpreted provisions on expropriation, national treatment 
and fair and equitable treatment in starkly divergent ways. In turn, they have fuelled high-
stakes uncertainty in the evaluation of policy space and litigation risk. 
 
Second, investment treaties rely on the remedy of damages in cases often stemming from 
difficult judgment calls by governments in complex areas of policy. This can put 
arbitrators in a bind. Do they order a state to pay damages after finding that it violated an 
unclear rule? Or do they dismiss the claim, leaving the investor reeling after a long, 
expensive arbitration? Compared to other forms of public law judging, the system gives 
few options to respond to government conduct that is characterized, well after the fact, as 
unlawful. 
 
Third, the use of arbitrators instead of judges to decide basic tensions in public policy 
makes it essential that the process be credible and independent. However, investment 
treaty arbitration lacks key safeguards of independence that apply to courts, including 
security of tenure, an objective method of assigning judges to specific cases, and checks 
on income-earning activities outside of the judicial role. 
 
This invites unsavoury questions. What are the business interests of the arbitrators chosen 
to decide a case? With whom might they have a common outlook at the International 
Chamber of Commerce, ICSID and others that wield key powers over arbitrator 
appointments? By allowing the arbitration industry to make final decisions in matters of 
public law, investment treaties remove longstanding safeguards that protect judges from 
economic and financial entanglement and that ensure public confidence in the courts. 
 
How should governments respond? One option is to re-introduce a mediating role for 
domestic courts, including perhaps the courts of neutral states not involved in a specific 
dispute. Another is to look for ways to re-introduce safeguards of judicial independence, 
such as by designating a roster of eminent jurists, drawn from outside the commercial 
arbitration industry, from which arbitrators would be chosen. 
 
On the rules, governments could clarify that investment treaties are designed to offer an 
exceptional remedy in cases of serious abuse or targeted discrimination against a foreign 
investor, but not a wide-ranging opportunity to challenge general laws and policies. 
Nearly all government measures harm some people while helping others, not because this 
is the aim of the regulation but because all general decisions, by definition, have ripple 
effects across the economy and society. Requiring public compensation for those foreign 
investors who are “harmed” by a general measure skews markets, as well as regulation, 
by inappropriately privileging one group of private interests over all others. 
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There are various ways to address the lack of independence, fairness and coherence in 
investment treaty arbitration. But the root questions are familiar. How should the tension 
in law between stability and change be resolved, and by whom? 
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Chapter 30 
 
Mining for facts: PacRim Cayman LLC v. El Salvador 
 
Alexandre de Gramont* 
 
In the above chapter, Professor Gus Van Harten uses the PacRim v. El Salvador 
arbitration, pending at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), as the basis for asserting a number of criticisms against the overall system of 
arbitration under investment treaties.  
 
The problem is that Van Harten has embraced a version of the facts that is very similar to 
that promulgated by the Government of El Salvador (GOES), without even 
acknowledging the allegations made by PacRim. The one-sided presentation of the facts 
contributes, in part, to a critique of the system that is off-target. 
 
I must disclose that I serve as counsel for the claimant in the PacRim case. Given that 
Van Harten has effectively presented only El Salvador’s side of the case, I will briefly 
present the claimant’s side here. The juxtaposition of PacRim’s version of the facts 
against El Salvador’s helps demonstrate why the issues posed by these cases are often 
more complex than presented in the above Chapter – and why a neutral, independent 
system to resolve these disputes is so important. 
 
Van Harten’s premise is that GOES had to act against PacRim because of environmental 
concerns that GOES did not previously recognize when it invited PacRim to invest in the 
country, and when GOES enacted the mining and environmental laws under which 
PacRim carried out its activities in El Salvador. According to Van Harten, the issue is 
simply whether and how an investor should be given redress when a government has 
acted reasonably to safeguard its environment. But according to PacRim, GOES did not 
act reasonably, rationally or fairly. PacRim’s project would have set new standards for 
environmentally clean gold mining in the Americas.   
 
PacRim – led by a group of geologists who are dedicated to green mining and sustainable 
development – searched throughout Latin America before choosing this location in El 
Salvador. PacRim chose the site in large part because its geology allows for extremely 
clean, underground mining, with very limited surface disturbance and virtually no 
possibility of ground water contamination. The project would easily meet the regulatory 
requirements of any developed country where gold is mined (including, for example, 
Sweden, Canada, and the United States), while also bringing enormous economic benefits 
to an especially impoverished region of an already poor country.   
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But El Salvador’s regulators never ruled on PacRim’s application. Nor have any of the 
laws and regulations under which PacRim invested in El Salvador been changed. Rather, 
in the midst of a difficult election campaign, then-President Saca – attempting to outflank 
his opposition on the left – announced that his administration would not grant any more 
mining permits. The only “changed circumstances” here involve a highly-charged 
political situation, where wildly inaccurate information and accusations against PacRim 
have made any rational, informed or balanced discussion of the issue impossible. The real 
question posed by these circumstance is: in what forum are both sides most likely to 
receive a fair, neutral and objective hearing on their respective cases? 
 
Van Harten is critical of the system’s use of independent arbitrators. He suggests that it 
would be better for government appointed judges to hear these cases, or that it would be 
preferable to select arbitrators from “a roster of eminent jurists, drawn from outside the 
commercial arbitration industry.” But governments like El Salvador’s agreed to have 
these cases heard by independent arbitrators, who are not selected by states or 
governmental organizations, to remove any appearance of governmental influence or pro-
government bias.  
 
Van Harten’s suggestion that the “business interests” of the independent arbitrators who 
hear these cases are unknown – possibly raising conflicts of interest – is inaccurate. Each 
side typically picks an arbitrator, and the chair is usually appointed upon agreement of the 
parties. The arbitrators and their backgrounds are well known to the parties. Indeed, the 
parties and lawyers who use the system have effectively created a de facto list of 
arbitrators with significant experience in these cases. It includes former judges and 
government officials, law professors and private lawyers. In the PacRim case, the three 
arbitrators (an Argentine lawyer, a French law professor and an English barrister) not 
only have diverse backgrounds; they have collectively served as arbitrators in over 
twenty investor-state cases.  
 
While Van Harten is correct that there have been some inconsistent and contrary rulings 
issued by tribunals in these cases, the same is true for virtually any court and any legal 
system. For the most part, the arbitrators are acutely aware of their obligation to create a 
consistent, transparent and predictable body of investment laws. Van Harten is also 
correct that there is room for improvement. But much has been accomplished and 
improved in a system that was hardly used ten years ago. The drafters of CAFTA (which, 
along with El Salvador’s Investment Law, provides the basis for PacRim’s claims) and 
other so-called “new generation” treaties have attempted to address various critiques of 
earlier treaties. Among other things, CAFTA provides for great transparency, in which all 
of the pleadings and briefs, as well as the hearing, are public. In PacRim, the hearings 
have been broadcast live via the Internet (and can still be watched on ICSID’s website). It 
is difficult to envision a better way to resolve the factual (and legal) dispute between 
PacRim and El Salvador – and perhaps to improve the system through a candid, open and 
balanced debate concerning both its strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 
